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I. Introduction
Allindividualsor families do not receive the same income or earn-
ings. This inequality, the most indisputable fact about the distribution
of income, has been found in capitalist and socialist economies, in dem-
ocratic and dictatorial countries, and in Biblical through modern times.
There are other characteristics of the income distribution that are
nearly as well documented for modern countries. For example, the
distribution is not symmetrical but has a longer right—hand tail,and
both average income and its variance generally increase with education and age.1
Why inequality occurs and why the distribution has its particular
characteristics is a matter of concern to many people. Certainly society
and government have expressed a desire to establish a minimum floor for
members of society —thoughthe level of the floor and the means of achieving
it are matters of debate. Besides a direct interest in the questions of
the sources of inequality, how to achieve income redistribution thd the
efficacy of various policy tools, economists are also concerned with establishing
how various labor markets operated how rational individuals are, and how
important are individual effort, chance, and predestination.2
Spurred on by these questions economists have constructed various
theories that purport to explain the ncorne distribution. Some aspects
of these theories have been tested against empirical observations.3 This
study will extend the range of such tests. In addition, we will generate
some new facts that a complete theoryshouldbe able to explain.
1For internationalcomparisons see Lydalif 30]. For the U.S., Millerft3].
2These terms will be definedmore rigorously below.
3See, for example, Mincer[}.—2—
The Personal Distribution of Earnings
Personal income is equal to the sum of labor earnings, returns to
capital, and transfer payments. Transfer payments are determined by
political and societal forces and will not concern us in this study. While
the distribution of income from capital is partly determined by economic
forces, it will not be the primary focus of this study —partlybecause of
the paucity of data in our sample. Earnings from work, to which the
Introductory statments on inequality also apply and which will be the
primary focus of our study, currently constitute about two—thirds to
three fourths of national income.
Most theoretical and related empirical work on the distribution of earnings
fall into the "human capital" or"stochastic" theory categories or a blend
thereof. The human capital model assumes that people are paid a wage equal
to their (real)marginal product which varies over individuals because
of differences in inherited or acquired skill levels. The stochastic- theories
assume that an individual's earnings over time depend on the cumulative
historyofrandom events.
II. Supply and Demand for Labor
A traditional method of analyzing labor markets is via supply and demand
curves. Suppose for the moment that all people are homogeneous with respect
to skills that determine earnings. Assume that with a given quantity of
capital and other factors of production, the marginal product of labor decreases
as the number of employees increases. In a competitive labor market (withno
on the job training) employers will hire that number of workers at which the
marginal product is equal to the real wage rate, W/P(for convenience we
il1 set P at 1 and henceforth speak of wages only). This demand curve is—3—
given at DD in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the supply curve for thepopulation is SS which is
assumed to slope upwards because it takeshigher wage rates to induce
people to forego leisure. The equilibriumwage rate of W will clear the
market and everyone who works thesame hours will earn the same amount. This
conclusion, which is, of course, contrary to factdepends crucially on
the assumption that eachperson has the same skills but this study isto
a large extent based on the proposition thatmany different skills —inherited
and acquired —helpdetermine earnings. It is fairlyeasy, however, to
incorporate many types and levels of skillsinto the above analysis if what
is known as an "efficiency units"model js valid. Suppose individualone,
who has a particular complex ofskills, is designated the "standard"person.
Let capacity be designated as C.As long asC/C1 always equals b. we can
state that the th person is equivalentto b. standard workers.
\dTIJ&c
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- Sincethe employer would be indifferentto hiring person 1
at a wage of say or person j at wage of bW0 thedemand curve in Figire 1
can be redrawn in standard workerunits. The supply curvecanalso be drawn
in efficiency units as whereisthe quantity of labor theth
person wouldoffer at a particular standardized wage rate. Inthisefficiency
nodel a person who is 110pçr cent of standard capacitywill alwaysreceive
awage 110per centof the standard wage, but the equilibriumlevel of the
standardwage will vary with thesupplyand demand curves.
Animportantset of questions that arise with this model are:what
particularskills determine capacity; are these skillsinherited or acquired;
and,isthe quantity of acquired skills consistentwith the amount economiStS
would define as optimum? Before consideringthese questions, however, we
will examine briefly a model in which relative capacity, C/C1,isnot fixed
but varies.
The world of work is subdivided into manydifferent occupations which
are associated with different tasksand levels of responsibilitY. For example
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles differentiatesthousands of occupations.
Some occupations and tasks require physicalstrength, some mental ability,
etc., and some require combinationsof particular skills. A person's
relative capacity mayremainconstant within an occupation but vary over
occupations.4 Thus a person's observed or effective relativecapacity
would depend ontheoccupation he would work in which in turndepends in
part on the occupational wage structurewhich can vary
4Even this need not be true. For example, different typesof skills
maybemore or less ioiportant depending onthe types of machinery used.—5—
over time. Though this model jS
comnlicated irk principle it is still
'possible to formulate and solve it asa general equilibrju model, in which
ndivjdua1s choose that Occupation whichyields themthehighest income or
5,6
Utility.
One particularly Important feature of thisoccupation—ski model is
thatsomeskills may not be at all useful insome occupations. Suppose
for example the only twooccupations are manager and manual, worker and that
intelligence received such a highwage in managerial work, that all people
with an I.Q. above 110 aremanagers. Assume also that physical strength
Is of no importance as amanager but that among manual workers strength
increases capacity while I.Q. doesn't.Finally assume all those with I.Q.
greater than 110 have above average strength(though the correlation is
not perfect). Then for people withI.Q. above 110, variations instrength
would not affect earnings while for thosewith lower I.Q.'s and less
strength only variations in strength would affectearnings. Thus in this
example each skill Is redundant in oneoccupation and only a portion of
the distribution of each skill determinesearnings. This analysis, of
course, suggests that it may be necessary to examineearnings functions
5. &i1
Tinbergen,'hasformulated this type of model andRedehas examined some features of such a model though heuses somewhat different terminology.
6lndeed the usualgeneral equilibrium models admit of theinterpretation that each individual Is aseparate factor of production because he has his own bundle of skills.—6—
within occupations and that in the whc1e samplethe effect of a skill may
have upper and lower limits.
-Wewill return to this question but for now let us
returnto thesimplerefficiency units mcdcl. At the end of our previous
discussionofthis iodel we raised certain questions aboutwhat skills
determineearnings or capacity. At a generallevel we can classify these
skills as cognitive1 affective, physical, andpsychological. Cognitive
skills include learned facts and information,asweI dcsion making
abi4t4s.Affectiveskills include leadership and social behavior.
Physical skills include strength,coordination, and dexterity while
psychological skills include extroversion,reaction to stress, and degree
of neuroticism, etc.
Atthisstageofour knowledge, we hardly know which particular
skillsdetermineearnings or capacitysince nosaniple contains reliable
measures of all feasible skills andfew samples contain direct measures of
evena representative skill from each ofthe categories mentioned.7,8
However, several studies have shown thatcertain aspects of intelligence
andof leadership are valid. See Taubman-WaleS (],Grilichesand
Mason (ifl,Wise(j].andFeatherman tic].
7-
Indeedfor some possible skills, appropriate measureshave not yet
beendesigned.
Perhaps the Terntan samplcontainsthe most information but it is
small and limitedt popie with I.ç.'s (aschildren) of 140 and over.
The ProjectTalennd to a lesser extent the Little_Scwella1Ple have
more skill information for the periodwhen their respondents were in
elementary and high school, but currentlylittle in the way of earnings
data since the people graduated high school noearlier than 1958.—7—
Suppose, however, that we had measurements on an exhaustive list of
skills for each individual. We co'üd then estimate an earnings equations
such as
(1) Y=aX1+bX2...cX+u
where Y is earnings, X1 ...Xare the N measures of skill, and u is a
random error representing ttlUCkttorinititutional phenomena.9
Each coefficient in the equation indicates the effect on earnings of
Increasing the associated X by one unit. It is worth noting that the
coefficients may not be stable over tiie. For example suppoe there Is
a big increase in the supply of any X. In the efficiency units model,
this will lead to shifts in the supply curve (in efficiency units) and a
decrease in the standard wage rate which in turn would decrease all
coefficients proportionately. In mor complex models, the effect on the
coefficients of an increased supply in any one skill level depends upon the mdiv—
idualsupply and demand elasticities for each skill as well as cross
9AS equation 1 is written, all skills havean independent, linear
effect. This reDreentation was chosen for simplicity. Interactions
between skils should not be assumed away in empirical work especially
because Roy'3tias demonstrated that if skills affect earnings multiplicatively,
symmetric skill distributions yield asynmetric earnings distributions--an
Important feature of the observed distribution. See also MandelbrotD..LJ—8--




whileestimation of equation 1 with many skills would represent a
major achievement, our task woitid not be over since we wouldthen want to
know what deterci. the level of each X or what policies could affect the
distributionofearnings.
Inheritedand Acouirc;d Skills
The level of any skill or attribute a person possesses at any point
of time is determinc3. by his genetic endowments
and by his environments Aswe are using the term "environment," itin-
cludes all post-conception events that influence the individual. Thus
it encompasses forrral and informal training for all the skills discussed
earlier, pre-natal diet) expenditures on heaith which determinewhether ills
can be used, and random events. A huge literature has beendevoted to assessing
the relative importance of nature an&.nurture for particular skills and
attributes.2 Aswe come closer to estimatingequation 1 this literature
9here isone other specialcase to note. It is possiblethatonly
skilldifferences relative to the average matter, e.g., the brightest lawyer
may receive twice as much per case as the average lawyer.If all lawyers
received more training and increased their legal skills X per cent, none may
receive more earnings. However, the effect on earnings on legal brightness
between lawyers should be given by the coefficientsin (1).
II
The genetic effect can be both direct and indirect. For example
a persons knowledge level can depend on ir.nate abilityand on educational
attainment which is partlydetermined br innate ability.
Seefor example Jinks and Fulker (j.),Burt(), Cavelli-Sforza
(1) or.iittler(3/ ).—9—
—will become more important in economics, but at the currenttime, it does
not seem necessary to summarize it. It is worthnoting, however, that
the relative importance of nature and nurture canvary over time as the
distribution of genetic endowments and of environmentchanges. In par-
ticular new environments such as better schooling,day care centers, and
prenatal diet could have large effects even if nurture was notimportant
for older cohorts.
Training
Since we have not measured all the possible skillsnor knowtheir
nature-nurture combination, we will not estimateequation 1. We will,
however, make use of a modified procedure. Suppose each of'theX'S is
represented as a function of genetics and environment. If forexample
(2) X1= cG+
dN1
where G is genetic endowmentsand N is environment, and iis the individ-
ual, we can then rewrite equation 1 as
(3) Y1=aCj GZ.j ad N =eG1 +f1 N
Equation 3representsprogress primarily because we do have measures of
several aspects of environment (as well as a few G's
as approxiitated by I.Q.).
People learn or increase their skill levels inmanyways withsome
methods better for some skills than others. Howeversome of the most im-
portant "training" Institutions are the family,peer group, school,
military,and work.—10-
Thefamily can affect the child's cognitive, affective,physiological
and psychologicaldevelopment by a variety of subtle and obvious means
including: thebehavior and attitudes of parents and Biblings; material
and nonmaterialgoods and services provided to the child; lovearid affection;
anddegree of permissiveness in rearing. Itwouldbe most useful and convincing
ifwecould incorporate measures of parental behavior, love,material goods,
etc., in our equations. Wedon't have such information and are reduced
tousing prcxieswhich are more or less crudely related to the truevariables
we wish to include.
There are several difficulties in interpreting thecoefficients of a
proxy. A proxy, by definition,is assumed to be correlated with the true but
unobserved variable. But the proxy may be insignificant, thoughthe phenomena
ittriesto represent is important, because the proxyis too crude a measure, i.e.,
has too low a correlation with the true variable.Alternatively the proxy
used may be correlated with several true variableswhose separate effects we
may be interested in. For example,fathers education may be related to his
earnings, his methods of child rearingand certain genetic (andthus partially
13,14
;nheritable) abilities. Fortunately Ifseveralproxies are used, itcan
beshown that each proxy will tend to reflecttheunderlyingvariable to
which itis mosthighlycorrelated.
Wewill useproxy variables such as familyincome and wealth, religion,
• urban or rural residence, parents' education and occupation ,whichare all often
available and made use of. We will supplement thislist with other
3SeeKagan[1jforthe.last. Someofthe former are discussed in Sewell, et al.
The child will get one half of his genes from one parent and in a world
without either assortive mating or dominant andrecessive genes will onaverage
regresstowards but notreach the mean ofinnate ability.
15See CrockettL 3..J"Technical Note."—11—.
proxies that we think are relatedtochild rearing techniques and family
atmosphere.It is worth emphasizing thatfamily statuscoefficients in
an earnings equation onlyrepresentthe direct effect of such status.
Generally, there is also an indirect effect since familybackgroundhelps
determinethe level of educational attainment (and other parts of"environment").
a person acquires.
The peer group can also affect the amount of schooling aperson
acquires and can directly affect all broad skill categories through its
attitudes and reward structure, but we have little or nódataon.the:peergroup.
Both sociologists and economists have incorporated formal schooiing
into the earnings equation. For reasons that will beclear later it must
beemphasized that schooling can affect cognitive, affective, physiological,
andpsychological skills though there- is noreliable information on which
ofthese changes determine earnings.16 Thernost common though obviously
verycrude measure of educationisyearsof schooling. However,following
thelead ofSolmon and Wachtel (9'/) whousedthe same sample, we will also
17 incorporate certain measures of college quality.
The Arur may makemen but we will not study the question in this book
sinceall the people were inthe military. While all the people in our
sample worked, the amount and type of work and of learning on the job has
varied by individual and can affect earnings. Indeed a major innovation
in the earnings distribution literature is Mincer's theory of investment
16Forevidence on some noncognltive effects as well as the mechanism
by which education causes these changes see Simon and Ellison (1).
17Aprob1e with of these taires is that they seem nore
related to cognitive development than the other skills. However certain
information on type and size of college may be related tononcognitive changes.—12—
in on—the—job training, which is described below in more detail and sub—
.ject to empirical verification in Chapter
Human Capital Theory
The economic definition of capital is any thing that will yield
benefits over some future period. While under this definition a person's
genetic inheritance is as much "capital" as is financial inheritance,
-
theeconomic literature on hunancapitalhas relegated this "conceived
stock" to a secondary role and concentrated on schooling, health expendi-
tures and other means by which a person can acquire or maintain skills.
In part this emphasis occurs because if a person must invest to acquire
a set of skills1it is possible to ask both what factors determine how
viuch investment a person will acquire, and Jhatthe otimalmountof Luvest—
ment a rational person should make in any time period. In additionit is
difficult to obtain measures of the elements of the conceived stock
(with the partial exception of intelligence).
It is possible to examine the consequences of artinvestmentfunc—
tionon the level and distribution of annual and lifetime earnings with
due allowance for the distribution of the inherited abilities as is
brilliantly done by Becker [5],andby Mincer [35.
Becker'sschooling model assumes that each dollar spent on education-—
through tuition, governnient subsidy, or earrtings foregone from not working——
viii increase skills, attributes, etc. These newskillsand attributes
viii yield both a new, constant level of earnings and nonpecuniary returns
to the individual. Becker then asks what heSitribut1on. of;earnings.—13—
wøuId:be.if each person were a rational irvestor who is certain of hiz
yieldfron education.18 Assuning thatnonpecuriiary returns are zero,
Becker shows that the equilthri.usn conditions is that r. in.wherer.
3 3 3
is the marginal rate of returnon and iu.thefinancialcost of schooling
for the th person. Becker assutesr is.subject to diminishing returns
and varies with the pelson's ability while m is assumed to increase with
19
educationand depend on family resources."Becker then derives the
earnings distribution under alternative assumptions and shows, for
example, that the distribution can be skewed to the right. The particu—
lar answer, however, depends on the distribution of (the functions of)
m and r and their covariance.2°
This schoolingmodel assumes that theextraearnings from education
wouldbe constantover time but in fact extra earnings increase with age.
Within thecontext of thehxnan capital model, these changes could be due
to maturity (with an interaction with education) but available evidence
wouldsuggest that from age 20 to 50, naturity per se is not important
for changing the level of most cognitive and affective skills. Mincer
however has demonstrated that the human capital analysis can account for
18 . / Or is risk neutral if there is uncertainty.
'9Thismay not be as true in our sample since the G.I. Bill provided
for tuition up to $500 a year and a stipend of $100 a month. These pay-
ments in effect reduce the interest rate to zero and sharply reduce
tuition and forgone earnings.




a rising age—earnings profile, which vary by education level, if people
invest rationally in "general" on-the-job training (QJT). By defini-
tion, general training is that which is as useful to other eitployers as
the one giving the training. But since training is embedded in the
worker, after being trained he can offer his services to any employer
(in the absence of enforceable long-term employment contracts). There—
fore in a competitive labor market the enployee would receive wages
equal to his new, higher marginal product, or in other words all the
benefits of the training.
The xodel, at this point, is indistinguishable from a learning by
doing model. Nincer, however, takes the analysis one very important
step further. Specifically Mincer argues that a person will choose that
occupation which offers him the largest amount of lifetime earnings, dis-
counted to the present. Suppose therefore that occupation A involved
training and occupation B did not. Also assume that initial wages were
the same in both occupations, hence, occupation B would offer the larger
22
discounted stream. In this case workers would leave B for A and new
entrants would choose A. As the supply of workers for A increased and B
21
His model can also explain a changing age profile of the variance of
earnings.
22
The occupation definition in this case is broadef than in our 'normal
use since it encompasses a whole occupational career moving from stock
boy to president.—15--
decreased, the starting wages in A would drop and those in B rise. This
adjustment would occur till the discounted value of the lifetime earnings
stream would the same. Note that as a result of the adjustment process,
wages in A initially will be below those in B and later above. The
(unobserved) drop in wages in the first year of work is the investment
in on—the--job training In that year.23'24
Denote Y as the individual's earnings with no learning by doing and
as the percentage of earnings invested in any year. Mincer generally
assumes that X declines with years of work. One form he often uses is:
(4)
where A is a scalar that varies iver persons, b is the decay rate that is
the same for all persons, and t is the time since beginning work.
23
The rational investment in human capital concept can be applied to
any portion of the environment which produces or maintains skills. For
example one interpretation of the observed effect of family SES on earn-
ings (education, wntal ability, etc. constant) is that more and better
training that augments earning related skills occurs in families with a
high2r SES. But the rational investor model would suggest that parents
allocate their time so that at
Mu(X)P
MU(Y)
where Wi is marginal utility, X is the (discounted value) of the child's
extra earnings from a unit of parent's time, while Y is any other use of
time, and I' and P are the respective prices.
calculating the investment costs in other years, an adjustment
would have to be made for returns on prior investments.—. 6—
• Depending on the investment function, Mincer derives a human capital
earning function such as:
(5) 1nYlnY+eS+ft
where S is years of schooling, e is the rate of return on S, f is the rate
of return on OJT and Y is determined by genetic endowments and the other
elements of the environment that affect skills and earnings.
Another way to view Mincer's model is that earnings only change over
time because of continued investment in the on—the—jobtraining.25 His
earnings model, therefore, can be rewritten as:
(6) Y (l+r E At A) t n'l n
where A is defined above andY is the constant stream, determined by
genetic endowments and all aspects of environmet except OJT. As long as
A decreases over time, earnings will increase with age. Mincer, moreover,
demonstrates that in his model the variance of Y and of log Y need not




This is not quite true in the sense that Mincer allows for transitory
events in any year and for maturation and senescence. But these can be
ignored at this point.
See [ ] pages.—17--
-Mincer'stheory is in the tradition of much of economicanalysis
of competitive markets and has the attractive featureof being consistent
with such observed regularities as risingageearnings profile and with nearly
arrageprofile of the variance of earnings. Moreover as Mincer hasnoted
it is possible to obtain estimates of e andf, the two rates of return,
within a decade of individuals entering the labormarket.
M1e the model has all these advantages, it hasseveral particular
disadvantages. First of all, the model assumes that because ofindividual
actions tie market always generates the type ofequilibiu he makes use of.
But consider for a moment the informational requirementsnecessary for
this market to function. On the schooling side theindividual must estimate
27 the expected increase in his earnings for eachyear of his working life.
This is a formidable task--especially if education interactswith characteristics
such as drive or particular types of innate ability inproducing earnings
capacity.
For the OJT investment model, the worker has to be able tocalculate
the increase In skills or the general learning bydoing contained in any
occupation. In addition in both instances the worker will have toestimate
if the current information that he can obtain,say from Census data, is
applicable to the future or if an equilibiurn situation is about tobecome
disequilibrium or vice versa. These are severe
2If theperson is not risk neutral, he will also have to examine the
variance (or other measures of dispersion) of the extraearnings. If Mincer's
model is correct onlytheconstant earnings difference, ,need be estimated
but the worker ould need toread Mincer to knowhowtocalculate this figure fromavailabledata.—18—
informational requirements which may resultinlabor marketfailure,
i.e.,the market maynotact as predicted.
Even if the information requirements are met, equation (5) may not
hold nor be interpreted as above because of nonpecuniary returns to edu..
cation. That is, evidence at least as reliable as that on earnings
indicates that education has nonpecuniary rewards. Similarly, the OJT
modelshould allow for such nonmonetary returns as pride and status as,
e.g., in the professorial labor market. Yet the rational investor model
requires these nonpecuniary returns be included in the r that is to be
equalized to n. Thus the coefficients on S or t in an earnings equation
need not equal the rate of return on investment.
Finally the models assume that a unit of schooling or OJT always
emits the same capacity as a personages and that variations in earnings,
with wage rates fixed, must reflect changes in capacity from maturation,
illness, or OJT, etc. As explained below such an assumption seems invalid
for some labor market situations.
It is difficult to construct a definitive test of the schooling
model because nonpecuniary returns and the individual's cost of financial
capital cre seldom known. It is possible, however, to test Mincer's OJT
theorysinceas expressed in (6) his model predicts that those below average
In earnings early will be above average later and will have a faster growth
rate in earnings. Below we will expound on this in greater detail
and perform the indicated tests.—19—
Sorting and Signalin1 fodels
There are some occupations suchas fruit picker and commissioned
salesman) in which it is possible to determinequickly and cheaply the
Inareinal product of an individual worker and in whichthe success or
failure of one worker does not determine themarginal product of other
workers in the firm. In theseoccupations, a firm should be willing
to set a piece rate and hireanyone who applies for a job. There are
other jobs such as a position on anassembly line in which it may be
possible to determine the number of bolts tightened andnot tightened
by a worker but where the failure ofany one worker on the line will
reduce or destroy the output of other workers.In this interdependent
situation, the firm would be able to mcasurea person'smarginal pro-
duct, but as long as it can not collect for thedestroyed units the firm
Eiay find it profitable to try to minimize the number ofpeople with less
than the necessary skill level needed for thejob. Finally there are
some jobs such as manager in which it is difficultto measure both the
actual and potential productivity ofany worker and in which there are
interdependencies. Here again the firmmay want to sort people into
groups which have more or less of the skills associated withsuccess on
the job.
Within most firms there are a number of "careerleaders" within the
semi—skilled, skilled, and categories with some
possibility of going from one ladder to another. Whenthe firm does not
know a person's productivity and whena complex and difficult to measure—20—
setof skillsareneeded for success, it is possible for firms to usevariOus
"signals" to assign a person to a particular job andthen monitor his.performance
to determine whether to retain, promote or fire the person.The sorting model
suggeststhat the extraearnings from educationneed not be constant over time
even if his potential capacity is. This is especiallytrue if Mayer and Lydall's
observations on span of control, capacity and hierarchical organizationare
valid.
Whilethefirm learns of the individual's talents, the indivdaal
can also receive training and knowledge whichIsspecific to the firm.29
As showninBecker (j ) partof specific training shows up in higher wages
of the trainee. Specific training canoccurina world without signalling.
But the chance to acquire or the capacity to benefit from specifictraining
mayberelated to position in the firm, which is dependent on signalling.
Thesorting and signalingmodels, which can be based on profit
maximizing behavior, would still imply that earnings depend oninherited
and acquired skills but the coefficients would have differentinterprettioflS
than in the Becker-Mincer model. The models also have differentImplications
for the relationship between annual and life-time earningssince those who
are more skilled will always have above average earnings.
Taste for Risk and Nonpecuniary Rewards
The models we have been examining explain earnings bydifferences in
skills. It is possible, hoever, to explain some featuresof the distribution
by differences in tastes towards work or nonpectiniaryreturns from work.
Friedman (1()forexample, has suggested that skewness arises becausewhile
30
most persons are risk averse, some people are risk lovers. Those in the
29Several people including Arrow ()andSpence ('-1$) have examined
signalingmodels.Taubman and Wales have constructed a test for the useof
educationas a signal and have concluded that perhapsone-half of the educational
earnings difference are due to increased producitivityproduced by education
and the ramaindcr is due to signaling on in their terminoi3screening. In a
sense the sorting model is implicit in someMarkov schemes, but Wise has
explicitly made use of such a sorting model to explainhow earnings may vary
with education. Reder has also suggested that the amountsand types of firm
specific training mayvary bytype of job while signals are used toallocate
people to initial jobs.
0AlternativelY he has also suggested that people are risk averse to
small changes butare willingto anbleto achievecorgains.—21—
latter group may initially choosean occuoatjon in which there is a small
chance of a very high incce. Sincesuccess is not wonovernight,eventually
we observe some of these who oucceed andover time the average earnings of
the Winners grows ore than those whowere risk averse. There is no
corresponding group of people with large lossesbecause, as Lebergett (')
points out, the inept (risk lover)generally can't raise enough financial
capital as the succesful ore. Lebergett, infact, presents some evidence
that for the nonselfemployed theearnings distribution is nearly symmetric--
though of course this needì not follow from theabove model since there are
some risky salaried occupations suchas stock broker.
Friedman's model is closely aligned with thatof von Neumann Morgenste]
in which a person bases his decisionson the expected value of the utility of a
set of outcomes, definedasP u(Aj) where is the probability of the
event occurring and U(Aj) is its utility.Consider two alternatives A and B
where A has only one possible outcomeA1 and B a whole set but an average
outcome .SupposeA1 equals .Thenit can be shown that if person has
diminishing marCinal utility he will attachmore utility to and choose A. In
other words he is averse to risk.Alternatively if his marginal utility
exhibited increasing returns, he wouldbe arisk lover and choose B in the
above example.
Whilein principle it is possible to Conductcontrolled experi-ents
in which people choose between variousalternatives to try todetermine a
person'sutility function and degree of risk aversion, we do nothave that
option. Instead we v-ill use a question dealing withpreferences for employment
versus self-employment and desire for jobsecurity. Certain problems inherent
in the use of these questions will be discussedlater, but one is important
enough to merit attention now. Most peoDleimPlicitly assume that an individual
who is risk averse in one activity suchas managing his financial portfolio
will be risk averse in all activities (Friedmanneed not assume this since he
has the same individual as riskaverse and risk loving depending on the span
of the outcome). This is avery restrictive assumption that one suspects is
not true. The word"susoects" is used becausemost examples that come to mind
of apparent contradictions,e.g., college professors with conservative financial
portfolios engaged in risky research on the frontiersof knowledge, incorporate
opportunities as wellastaste. In other words the exoected navoff fromthis
risky research nore than compensates forbur±n therisk. Stillthe author
isuncomfortablewith a once risk averse, always risk averse model.—z-.
The difference in average earnin'sof th' riskaverse and those
neutral towards risk can be thoughtof as anonpecunarYreward,called peace
of mind, received by those whodislike risk. There can bemanyother positive
and negative nonpecuniary rewards
attached to jobs. Those rewards are important
in ourstudyof the determinants of the earningsdistribution because non-
pecuniaryrewardscan induce offsetting changes inmonetaryrewards.31 The
choicebetween pecuniary andnonpecufliary rewards can be treatedin the general
frameworkofutilitymaximization. It is possible, hever,that tastes or
the parameters of the utility function arepartly determined by family back-
ground or byeducation in which case the extra earningsattributed to say
educationare inadequate as a measureofthetotal returns to education
32
if tastesare also included in theequation.
Thereare also substantial problemsin quantifying the trade—offs
between monetary and nonmonetarY returns.The twomajordifficulties are
determining which of all possiblenonpecuniary returns are relevantand
second measuring differences in preferences.In the data set we are
using we haveonly a few possible
nonpecuniarY rewards to examineand have
not had to choose. Our measures arecrude nd relate primarily to whether
a particular reward was operativeat a time of occupational choice.The
many problems associated
with these measures are discussed in chapters
Luck
With the partialexceptionof Friedman, the above theoriesassume
thatearnings reflect individualdifferences in skills ortastes. Some
economistshave suggested that the earningsdistribution at a point oftime
reflects the cumulativehistory 0±' luck startingfrom an initial distribution
based onskills. For example one version
of these theories can be expressedas:
t
• (6) = +e =Y+ ek
k=o
wheree israndom erro that isuncorrelatedwith andall other ekf S•
3Fore:ple, reasoning fron pers-D:2l
intrOspectlofl, some economists
have explained t'nuslythe los; earnings(and rate of return oneducational
investment) for Ph.D.'S and theologians.
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See for example and McConnell, Trowandyonge.LiJ.—23—
Inthese models can be determined by skill levels but over time these
skillsshould become less important determinants of earnings and the
distribution should approach that of er_k. Depending on certain assump-
tions—includingifYis replaced by lnY —thestochastic theories
cangenerate (asymptotically)lognormal, Pareto or other skewed to the
right earnings distributions.33 Below we will see if the implied
assumptions on the distribution of the growth in earnings are correct.
Also we will test the proposition that systematic determinants become less
important as people age.
III. The NBER Sample
In this study our empirical work will be based primarily on the 5,100
men in the NBER—Th sample. In this chapter and associated appendices,
we will discuss the main features of the sample and give an overview of
the distribution of earnings in several years.34
The sample was drawn from a group of some 75,000 men who during 1943
volunteered to enter the army air force's pilot, bombadier and navigator
training progam. The people in this group obviously had to meet the health
and physical requirements to be in the Army. Also according to Thorndike
and }lagen (TM) to enter this program, "a man first had to be single, be
between the ages of 18 and 26, pass a fairly rigorous physical examination,
and pass a screening aptitude tests the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination.
33See Champernowe [/0),Aitcheson and Brown[ .1),orthe excellent survey
ofMincer [3.5 ].
34Muchof the descriptive material is drawn from Taubinan andWales,Chapter
4 and from B. Wolfe's unpublished dissertationEj15—24—
This examination was primarily a scholastic
aptitude test, though perhaps
with a slightly technical and mechanicalslant. The qualifying scoreon
the screening test was set at a level thatcould be reached by approximately
half the high school graduates, thecountry over'.'35 The men who qualified
and volunteered for theprogram were then given a battery of some seventeen
tests which measure various types of mentaland physical skills. These
test scores as well as certain biographicalinformation on hobbies and
family background determined which of themen were accepted for the Air
Cadet program.
Thorndike and Hagen deáided in 1955 toundertake a study of the use-
fulness of the seventeen tests in predicting vocational success with the
hope of being able to aid the vocationalcounseling and choice of high
school students. They drew a sample of17,000 men who had taken a given
battery of tests between July and December 1943.Beginning in late 1955
ndthroughout1956, TH received responses from some 10,000civilians
and 2,000 men still in the military. The
questionnajr they used, which
is reproduced in Appendix B, containsamong other things an earnings occupation
history from World War II to the date of thequestionnaire. It is impor—
tant to note that because of their vocationalemphasis, much care and
attention was paid to assigning occupation codes.36
In 1968 Taubman and Wales(TW) contactedProfessor Thorndjke and
learned that he had retaineda printout of the test scores, earnings and
a few other items for 9,700 people whowere civilians in 1955 and the
Thorndjke and Flagen, [L ],pp.8 and 9.
36See theirdescription on pp.—25—
completed questionnaires for about 8,600 of these men. With the concurrence
of the air force, Professor Thorndike kindly agreed to make available
all this Information as well as the address list as of 1956.
It was recognized almost immediately thatit was possible to update
addresses via army serial numbers and the V.A.'s life insurance and claims
file.37'38 Thus John Meyer an Thomas Juster of the NBER quickly agreed
to conduct another interview using Bureau funds. This questionnaire, which
is reproduced inAppendixB, was eventually answered in 1969 and early
1970 by some 5,100 out of about 7,500 people for whom good addresses were
available.39 TW initially used the detailed information on education,
ability, family background, and personal characteristics from the two
surveys (forabout 80 percent of. the men) to examine the rate of return
to education and the use of education as a screening (signalling)device.
The respondents had been promised summaries of the results of
the questionnaire. When mailing these summaries in 1971, the NBER included
a short questionnaire to try to resolve some of the puzzles raised by TW
and others. Some 3,000 people responded to this one mailing. When funding
was received from the NSF for this project, another large questionnaire
dealing with more aspects of family background and other matters was sent
Out and was returned by 4,474 people.4° These last two questionnaires are
also given in Appendix B.
37The V.A. graciously provided new addresses at no charge.
38Additional updated were obtained by checking phone books of the city
of the last known address.
39Initially we had felt that 2,500 responses would have qualified this
survey as a success.
40The N.S.F. funds also enabled the NBER to extract more information from
the TI! questionnaire including the details on the job and earnings history.—26—
In a moment the sample will be compared with the U.S. population of
the same cohort. But first we wish to note that TH found little in the
way of response bias in 1955 —perhapsbecause they employed expensive
means such as the Retail Credit Corporation —tolocate men. Taubman
and Wales have shown that in 1969 the mentally more able and educated
were more likely to respond. However, TW also showed that there was
no significant difference in the 1955 earnings equations between those
who did and did not respond in 1969; thus, the data can be used for
structural analysis.
Sample Characteristics
The qualifications needed to be a potential member of this sample
quarantee that the NBER—TH sample, will not be representative of the U.S.
male population of the same age. About one quarter of the men fall
into each of the categories of high school graduate, some college,
bachelors degree, and at least some graduate work.42 Also a person
had to be in the top one half of the I.Q. distribution to enter this
program and the average ability level has been heightened by the af ore—
mentioned response bias.
The average age in 1943 was 21 with three quarters of the men aged
19—22. At least in 1943, the programs' qualifications assure us there
men were, on average, in better mental and physical health than the U.S.
41For thepost 1969 questionnaires we have adopted the practice of in—
cluding a "no response" dummy variable. Since this tends to be significant
over time the more successful are continusing to respond more.
42
This is a much better level of education than among World War II
veterans —evenif we restrict ourselves to high school graduates. See
Miller [3L/—27--
male population aged 18 to 26. Given that these men volunteered to train
for flight duty, it seems likely that they areless risk wverse than the
population as a whole, which may be a partial explanation of the high
percentage of people who are self employed inl969. We do not know
how many nonwhites if any are in the sample though the education and
test aptitude qualifications suggests to us that whites probably make
up 99 percent of thegroup.44
In her dissertation B. Wolfe has compared this sample and the
corresponding U.S. age cohort of white males on a number of characteristics.
She finds a higher percentage of ews and smaller percentage of Catholics
in this sample. The aen in this sample have fathers with above average
education (andoccupational status) and father—in—laws with even higher
educational attainment. Also the people in this sample have above eaverage
earnings in each year studied ,evenif the comparison is made with white
males of the same education and age with the differentials greater at
a later age and at lower levels of education Cwherethe sample is less
representative of the population. See below, or T.W., chapter 4).
It is of some interest to compare the earnings inequality in this
sample with that of the random sample of white males aged 45—59 (in 1966)
43The high percentage may also be due to the availability of V.A.
guaranteed loans, better financial position of parents and in—laws, or
business competence.
44However, several of the highest ranking black Air Force generals in
1972 were in the Air Cadet program in World War II.—28—
studied by Kohen, Parries and Shea[ They findforexample that
the shareof total family income received Li1968by the bottom 2c,50
75 and 95% is 14,35,62, and 89%respectivLLy. In the NBER—TH sample each
of the corresponding figures are smallerby 5 to 6 percentage points.
Thus despite having a more restrictedran1nmental ability, education
andriskaversion, the NBER—TH sample has cicreinequality in family
incomethan a nationwide cohort of about thesameage. This result
maybe due to the heavier concentration ofself employed in NBER—TH or
tothe heavier concentration of people in the:NBER—TH in the right hand
tailof the earnings distribution.
Clearlythe sample is not representative of theU.S. population and
inthe case of education and I.Q.. doesnot have any members of a large
portionof the population. Moreover some ofthedimensions in which
- itis nonrandom will be hown to be relatedto earnings. The nonrepresentative—
nessand truncation of some variables willmean that the distrjbjton of
earnings should not correspond to that for the U.S.population. Still
the sample can be thought of asa random stratifiedsample in which the
weightsfor various strata do notcorrespond to the population weights.45
It is well known that suchunequa1 weighting will not affect the unbiasedriess
of coefficients estimated from the data.Thuswe can use this sample to study
the effects of education, ability,etc. on various aspects of inequality.
We cannot,however, extrapolate the results to those levelsof education
45
The reader is reminded that TWrejected the hypothesis of a success bias over and above theresponse bias by education andabilitylevel.—29—
and ability not included in our sample. And as noted above measures of
inequality, such as variance, should not be the same as in the population.
However, such inequality measures calculated within education and ability
groups or the changes in the measures over time can apply to the population.
IV. A Summary of the Determinants of Earnings at Various Points of Time
This section is designed to summarize the results of earnings equations
for 1955 and 1969, presented in the appendix, by comparing the relative
importance of various variables both at a point of time and over time.
It is important to realize that we are discussing partial regression
coefficients in which all other variables in the equations in the
appendixhave been held castant.
In examining these results he reader is reminded that our underlying
theoretical model is that pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards depend on
a person's marginalproductivity. The various skills and talents that
determineproductivity as well as tastes towards riskand nonpecuniary
rewards are partly inherited and partlyacquired from schools, friends,
family, etc. We would like to determine both the skills or processes that
determine earnings and their relative importance. We also wish to
quantity the trade of fs between monetary and nonmonetary earnings.
Several measures of importance can be used. In this section we
will be primarily concerned with those related to the range and the
variance in earnings. Later we will consider issues connected with
skewness and kurtosis. An obvious measure of importance is the R2—30—
or the amount of the varianceexplainedby the set of variables.46 Of
course the R2 in our sample may not generalizeto the U.S. population
because our sample is truncated ineducati arid ability and is drawnmore
heavily from some strata than others. S1.ncwe do not know all respects
in which this sample differs from theU.S. Population nor how toextrapolate
the results to the truncatedportion of the population, we will nottry
to calculate a weighted R2. Many of theseproblems are less severe
when we compare total or partial R2'sfor the same people but in different
years.
The variance explained by a set ofindependent variables combines
two elements —thepredicted value of the dependentvariables, Y1, as
compared to the mean of Y, and the number oftimes each Y1 occurs. An
alternative measure of importance is the.difference In the average leyel
of earnings,Y1—?2, caused by a set of variables. This range measure is
related to the Y—Y portion of the variancebut does not indicate howmany
people are at each y1
Forease of exposition, we will discuss the 1955and 1969 resulti
for one variable at a time. Unlessotherwise noted, these resultsare
drawn from equations in whichmany other variables have been included.
is well known that it is difficultto measure the contribution of
one variable versus another to the total R2when the independent variables are not orthogonal.
47However, therange and variance only indicates the direct effect
of a variable. There can also be indirect
effects, for example, parental Income can determine educationalattainment.—31—
The variables which have been held constant include: education, mathematical
ability, various measures of socioeconomic background of the respondent
and of his wife, information on self employment and on teaching, a crude
measure of risk preference, age, and work experience, health, hours worked
marital status, and attitudes towards noripecuniary rewards. We never
explain more than 45% of the variance in earnings. Some of the unexplained
variance must be due to unmeasured but systematic variables. The coefficients
of any included variables will be biased if it is correlated with any
48
omitted variable which determines earnings.
Because of computer capacity limitations, we were forced to drop
some variables which were consistently nonsignificant in preliminary
runs. In the equations presented,, therefore, all the variables are
either significant in one or more years or were significant in either
the next to the last runs or in the Taubman—Wales (TW) equations from
which this analysis commenced. When we cite coefficients for variables
not in the last equation, the numbers are taken from the most complete
versions of the final equations in which the variable appeared.
Formal Education
Formal schooling can affect physical, cognitive, psychological,
and affective skills.49 It would greatly increase our understandinL of
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Formally, if the true equation is Y =Xci+ ZtS + u where u is a random
variable, the expected value of the ordinary leat suares estimate of 5
obtained when Z is omitted, is :E(a) =6+ E(X X) XZ 6 =ci+ 6. is equal
to the coefficient in Z =XB.The bias is 6 which is zero only ifor 6 is
zero.
49See, e.g., Simon and Ellison[ '1k), or Yonge, McConnell et alt ).J
for some evidence on the noncognitive developments.Table 1
The Increase in Earnings fromEducation in 1955 and 1969
rcentage Increase from
Time Period ucation for Average High
hool Graduate, Not Self
ployed, if Obtained and 1955 1968 1969 :ended the Quality of
Average AverageAverage lege of the Average
Age 33 Age 46 Age 47 son with Just Some Col1ee.
Some College 05% 08% 08%
Bachelors Degree liZ 25% 20%
Some Graduate 08% 22% 18%
Masters Degree 06% 23% 29%
Ph.D. 13% 32% 43
L.L.B- 06% 53%
M.D4 71% 82%
Source: Equation 2 in Table
In equation this variable was also included,in Ph.D. group. Moreover these are salaried peopleonly.
*NotS1gnificjan at the 5% level.
The variables in tleequation which have been heldconstant include:
education, mathematical ability, variousmeasures of Socioeconomic back-
ground of the respondent and of hiswife; information on selfempJoyment and on teaching; a crudemeasure of risk preference,age and work experejence health, hours worked, maritalstatus, and attitudes towardsnonpecuniary rewards.—32—
howandschooling does if we would identify the particular skills that
affect earnings and measure the change in all skills produced by schooling.
But since we do not have such measures nor even knowall skills which
should be measured, we will have to be satisfied with crude measures
of quantity and quality of schooling.
We represent quantity by level of education obtained. We use dummy
variables for various responses. Earnings in 1969 generally increase with
education. But despite our having included variables to hold constant
nonpecuniary rewards including those associated with pre college teaching,
risk preference, and self employment, those with just a bachelors degree
earn more than those with some graduate work. As shown in table 1 the
increase in earnings from education for the average high school graduate
ranges from 8 percent for some college to 82 percent for non self employed
M.D.'s with bachelors degree holders receiving 20 percent more.50'51 (We
have standardized by the average non self employed high school graduate's
earnings of $10,300).
Essentially the same percentage increases are obtained from equations
using the log of earnings. If we adopt Mincer's model [(], thesepercentage
50These calculationsassume that all post high school graduates attend
a college of the average quality of people who had only had some college.
The quantity effects are slightly larger when quality is omitted, but never
by more than $200.
511f selfemployment variables were not included the increases would
be: 14 percent for some college; 28 percent for bachelors; 80 percent for
L.L.B., and 110 percent for M.D.'s. These increases are less than those
given in TW primarily because of the introduction of self employment variables
though the graduate level coefficients were much smaller before we introduced
some variables related to nonpecuniary returns.—33—
changes divided by the associated number ofyears of education beyond
high school are an estimate of the rate ofreturn from education which
is less than 6 percent at all educationlevels.
In 1955 the same general patternemerges except that the effects of
education are uniforinally smaller —forexample, obtaining a bachelors
degree or some college would add 11 and 5percent more to the $6,000
(1958 prices) received by theaverage non self employed high school graduate —
andnot always statistically significant.However, our self employment
variables are onlymeasured in 1969. Theresulting measurement error has
probably caused us to overstate the relativereturns to education of the
not self employed in 1955.52
The total effect of educationmay be understated if one of the mechanisms
by which education alters earnings is measuredafter the completion of
education and is also included in ourequations. One such route would
be the Occupation the person was in.The variables on occupation we have
used in these equations are teacher, selfemployed businessman, and professional,
and business assets. The teachervariable is included because we felt
that teachers reteive morenonpecuniary rewards as a substitute forearnings
than is received in other occupations.53The various self employment
measures are designed to eliminate all of thereturn on financial capital
included in the earnings estimate; rewardsfor bearing the extra risk of
the self employment information isomitted the 1955 differentials
are: some college 11 percent; bachelorsdegree 14 percent; L.L.B. 14 percent and M.D. 82 percent, whichare very close to those given in T.W. Ifwe
adopt Mincer's interpretation of thelog equation, our estimates of the
rate of return to education are less than5 percent (exceptM.D.).
53However, the variablecould mean that on some unmeasuredaspect of the ability, teachers are less able.— 34-.
entrepreneurship; andperhapsunmeasured attributes that lead to being
a successful businessman. However, it is possible that these measures
have incorporated some of the influences of education. If these variables
were not included, the bachelors, some college and masters degree
coefficients would all be smaller.
It is also possible that a person's tastes for nonpecuniary rewards
or risk bearing are partially formed by education. The inclusion of
the so called nonpecuniary variables caused the some college and bachelors
level coefficients to decrease and the graduate level coefficients to
increase in both years.
College Quality
As a crude measure of college quality, we have included for each
person's undergraduate school the Gourmari Index ( of Academic Quality)
which is described in more detail in chapter 4 in [/iJ. Because the
index is scaled arbitrarily, we initially included it and its square
in the equations. Since these two terms together are never significant
and do not explain more of the variance of earnings than the linear term,
we use only the linear term.
In 1969 we find that attendance at a school that ranked 100 points
( the standard deviation) higher in the index is associated with a $450
increase in earnings. After our usual standardizing, the effect of the
100 point difference in college quality of 4½% is about half the size
of the effect of obtaining some college. In 1955 a 100 point increase
in undergraduate school quality leads tc$140 increase in earnings or
2j after standardization. Once again this is about half the size ofTable •2
















2nd 1/5th 05%* 05%
3rd 1/5th 05% 07% :,
4th 1/5th 09% 14%
top 1/5th 14% 19%
* Notsignificant at the 5% level.
The variables in th e equation which have been held constant include:
education, mathematical ability, various measures of socioeconomic back—
ground of the respondent and of his wife; information on self employment
and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference,age and work experience,
health, hours woked, marital status, and attitudes towards nonpecuniary
rewa rds.—35—
the coefficient on the some college variable.
It is interesting to note that the introduction of the quality
variable causes a 5% to 10% reduction in the coefficients of the Jewish,
year of first job, attendance at private high school arid attendance
at private elementary school variables as well as a 10% increase in the
pre college teacher dummy in 1969 and smaller changes in 1955. These
shifts are indicative of the fact that college quality can be both determined
by ( or correlated with) and act as a proxy for other personal attributes
that determine earnings. The quality index may still be acting as a
prxoy for unmeasured attributes but we would hnpe that it in part
measures the extra value added imparted by better schools.
The quality index used is ob,viously not the only one possible but
we have not studied this problem in detail since it is the focus of the
work of Wales [ 5, and especially of SolmonI 3].
Mental Ability
In TW it was found that the seventeen tests taken by the people
in 1943 contained at least four factors, but only the first factor which
was denoted mathematical ability but which probably correlates well with
a standard I.Q. measure, was a significant determinant of earnings.54
In both 1969 and 1955 we tested for an interaction between mental
ability and all other variables by computing separate equations within
each ability fifth. Using analysis of covariance, we could not reject
the hypothesis that the effects of all variables, including education,
were independent of the level of ability in each year.
54Noattempt was made here to reinvestigate the usefulness of the other
factors. Since we convert the test score data into dummy variables for the
different fifths of the factor score distribution, we are assuming thatpost
test taking events C not otherwise measured) do not change the fifths of
the ability distribution a person would belong to in each of the paricular
years studied.—36—
In both 1955 and 1969 as shown in table 2 the coefficientson each
of the top four fifths are significant. These coefficientsare not
sensitive to the inclusion of the self employment related variables.55
The effectsof each fifth increase in ability adds agreater percentage
to earnings in 1969 than in 1955, with the differences morepronounced
in the top two ability fifths.
The numbers in Table 2, which are divided by theaverage earnings
of the not self employed highhool graduate, can becompared directly
with those in table 1.Thus the average difference in earnings between
those in the top and bottom fifths of ability (14and 19% in the two
years) exceeds the effect of obtaining a bachelors degree in 1955 and
is nearly as large in 1969.
A person's test scores generally depend on his innateability, the
quality and quantity of pre test schooling, and differences in other
aspects of "environment." Often we would like to know what portion of
test scores (andassociated earnings) are due to genetics and to
environment. Suppose that the measures of religion, parent's andown
educational attainment, occupation, and incomeetc., included in our
earnings are the only environmental differences that determine testscores,
then ability coefficients in the earnings equation would benet of the
environmental influences.56 Of course, if otheraspects of environment
55Since people hadto be in the top one half of the ACGT to be
able to volunteer for the program, these fifthsare more like tenths.
561f this trueequation is Y =a(innateability) + bX but we estimate
Y =a*(innateability + CX) + b*X,, then our least squares estimate of a*
and b* are identical to those for a and L —ac.—37—
affect test scores, the ability coefficient will still be a mixture. We
examined the genetic! environmental problem in [/L7] and conclude that
in the tests we are using most of the variation in scores is due to genetic
differences( or other nonmeasured dimensions of environemnt). This
finding in no way tells us innate ability is more important than learned
knowledge since we have not examined the effects of various types of
learned knowledge on earnings.
Since the sample only includes the top half of the I.Q. distribution,
it seems safe to conclude that ability is a more important direct
determinant of the range of earnings than education for those who are
at least high school graduates. Even when self employment information
is not used, the same conclusions. are reached though the differences are
smaller.
Family Background
An individual's "socioeconomic background" can determine earnings
for a variety of reasons including being a prnxy for : genetic endowments;
differences in "training" which increase cognitive, affective, physical
and nonpecuniary rewards; and business contacts, "pull" and nepotism.
The measures of family background we have analyzed include: father's
education and occupation; mother's education and labor force participation;
wife's education and her parent's education and occupation; various data
related to family income, wealth, and size while the respondent was growingTable.-3
Increase in 1955 and 1969 Earnings Associated
'with Various Socioeconomic Measures
Family Never Moved before H.S. Grad.
Jewish
Protestant
Religious School Several Times/wk.
Never Went to Religious School
Biog 2nd Fifth and
Biog 3rd Fifth
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* Notsignificant at the 5 percent level.
Difference between spent most time andhardlyany time.
The variables in this equation which have been held constant include:
education, mathematical ability, various measures of socioeconomic back-
ground of the respondent and of his wife; information on self employment
and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience,
health, hpurs worked, marital status, and attitudes towards nonpecuniary
rewards.—38—
up; how the respondent spent his time while growing up, age at entering
school and religious preference.57
In TW the two measures of SES used were father's education and the
so called biography variable. This biography variable Is based on the
respondent's family income and education, his hobbies, sports and interests,
and his pre test education and gradee as reported in 1943.58 The weights
of this index are based on how well the items predicted success in
pilot and navigator school.
It was, of course, a bit frustrating that a variable made up of so
many disparate items with unknown contributions determined earnings. Thus
we are happy to report that Inclusion of information collected in 1969
and 1972 similar to that collectad in 1943 has substantially reduced tle
size of the biography coefficients, but the top 2 fifths are still sig-
nificant and the coefficients are monotonic. It is interesting to note
that the big shift in the 1969 and 1955 coefficients occurred only after
we included information on tastes towards nonpecuniary rewards and a
proxy for family wealth, implying that these are the components in the
biography variable that influenced earnings. The differences between
the top2 and the bottom fifth are 11% and 8% in 1955 and 1969. This is
57mis is a wider list than that used in mostprevious studies, and
some of the variables require justification as SES measures but almost
all of these variables are significant in 1969 and 1955. Several of the
variables have been used at one time or another by others; see,'for example,
Blau and Duncan [), andSewell et al [J.. ].
58
The original items, which were collected by the military, are not
extant though much information has been recollected in 1969 and 1972.—39--
one of the few variables that has a smaller percentage affect in 1969.
Additionally, the effects of father's education are reduced to
insignificance in both 1969 and 1955. Part of the reduction of the
importance of this variable occurs when the father is an owner variable
is introduced. But the reduction in the size and significance of the
coefficient is primarily associated with the introduction of the respondent's
business asset variables. Since this variable is not often used in other
studies, there is a suggestion that fatherTs education is a proxy for
familywealth and business ownership.
There are other SES variables which are significant. Perhaps
themost interesting of the new measures are the Jewish and Protestant
variables.59 Compared to Catholics, (as well as aetheists, agnostics and
others who all earn about the same amount In the various years), Jews
received from 33 to 40 percent more earnings than the average high school
graduate and Protestants from 3 to 9 percentless.6° The reader is reminded
50In1969 the respondents were asked to indicate their religious
preference by checking one of Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, None, Other.
It is possible that different answers would have been obtained if "the
religion you were raised in" was asked. Compared to the U.S. white population
the NBER—TH had 1.7 percent more of both Jews and others and 5 percent fewer
Catholics. However, the differences from white males in the particular
cohorts who were at least high school graduates would probably be smaller.
601f self employment and M.D. are not held constant, Jews earn even
more. The asset variable is measured imperfectly, but it is difficult
to attr[bute a difference of $4,000 a year to this. There are relatively
few aetheists and agnostics and others.—40—
that these differences are not of the influence of education(including
M.D.) mental ability, self employment, and various other personal attributes
and family SES dimensions.61
At least for the generation being discussed, it seems likely that
those who are Jewish had more of a taste for acquiring knowledge and
as shown in chpter achieve more education and go to better schools,
62 given ability and other SES measures. Hence for given levels of
schooling and mental ability in 1943, Jews may have acquired more
knowledge useful in earning a living.
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that some unmeasured
genetically determined characteristics are related to religion. Unfor-
tunately, since we do not know whTat nonmeasured attributes are important
determinants of earnings, we cannot usefully examine thegenetics literature
to see what if any differences exist by religion.
a study of college graduates of the first half of this century,
Hunt [ZO] also found similar qualitative results. Alsousing the same
basic data source as Hunt, Haverman and Wes.t [17] found thatbeing Jewish
was the most important determinant of earnings of people who graduate college
in the first half of this century. Featherman I i5 j also found Jewsto
earn more and some Catholics, such as French, to earn more than theaverage
Protestants. Both the Hunt and Featherman studies hold constant education
and mental ability as well as other variables.
62
,, Forexample, Bruce Eckland, Academic Ability, Higher Education and
Occupational Mobility" American Sociological Review,1965,pp. 735—746
finds that for given test scores and social class, Jewsgo to higher
quality institutions for learning. This would Indicate either hIghr tastes
for education, more motivation and drive, or lower costs relativeto returns.
He also finds certain ethnic groups of Catholics to do better thanthe
average Protestants. Given the education cutoff to be in the program,
it seems likely that our Catholics come heavily from thesesuccessful
ethnic groups.—41—
We also cann,t rule out the possibility that the Jews and other
nonProtesl:ants are a more select group of their respective populations.
However, given th nature of the Air Force work they volunteered for,
it might be argued thatthosewho volunteered could include more people
who wanted to gain revenge on Germany or to inflict destruction in large
doses quickly. But the revenge motive would seem to suggest that Jews
and to a lesser extent Catholics would be a more random (less select)
group of their religious compatriots.
That religious upbringing or the different environment in families
or various religions can mold the individual receives some further support
in the sample. That is, we find that those wbo remembered attending
religious classes (notparochial- school) several times a week earn 9
to 11% less than those who attended once or twice while those who did
not attend earn 1 to 4% less.
Another set of variables which reflect both the type of family and
affective, physical and cognitive, and psychological attitudes that can
be formed by the family and peer group is contained in the question (aked
in 1972) of "indicatehow you spent your time while growing up".63 The
categories examined were sports, hobbies, chores, part time job, reading
andother.The last two groups were never significant and will not be
discussed here except to note that reading is related to the ability measure
and educational attainment. The remaining categories were significant in
is for practically no time spent and5is for the most time spent.—42—
1969 but only part time job was significant in 1955. The difference in
earnings of those who spent prctLcally no time and the most time on
part time jobs is 5% and 11% Lu 1955 and 1969. It seems likely that
the men who came from poor fainLLles needed money for themselves and!
or valued financial success greatly. Thus these men would be willing
to work hard and apparently have succeeded with success being cumulative
over tune.64
In 1955 and 1969 those who spent much time on sports while growing
up, earn 4 and 10% more than those who spent practically no time.65
Several explanations of this result are available. First, activity in
sports may show up in later life as better physical fitness and as
shown below healthiness is related to earnings. (inthis explanation
1955 has a smaller impact because of less health deterioration at that
age). Second, most sports involve both a competitive and cooperative
structure which are also found in many work situations. That is, a
boy's play is training for the man's work. Third, activity in sports
may be indicative of energy and aggresiveness that pays off in the
business world.66 Finally, there is some indication in Thorndike and Ilagen
641f we are right about thetype of families these men came from,
I would expect them to have a high rate of time preference ,andless
access to capital early in their lives; thus, I would find it hard to
interpret the growth in earnings over time to an investment theory as in
Mincer.
is doubtful that this result is due to people becoming professional
atheletes since it was primarily baseball players who were highly paid
then (andTed Williams was in the Marines) and the sports which recruit
from college graduates would have had to gamble on rookies aged 25 or
more.
66Related to this last viewpoint is the idea thatpeople who play
sports may be more able to make decisions quickly. If intellectualism
Is taken as evidence of the opposite personality, it is interesting that
the Phi Beta Kappas among top management earn substantially less than
other people. See Taubman—Wales[, ]appendixon Liewelen.—43—
that in 1955 that sports distinguishes company presidents and vicepresidents
from treasurers. This suggests that sports itt the 1920's and 1930'swas
an indicator of family wealth and availability of leisure time, or an
indicator of attitudes such as risk taking.
The hobby variable has practically no effect in 1955 but in 1969
those who spent the most time on hobbies received 6% less which is
significant at the 10% level in the final equation. The:znost obvious
explanation for this finding is thatmany though not all hobbies represented
the opposite of sports and that the effects should be reversed.
The last and perhaps most difficult of these to explain is the chore
result. Those who spent much time on chores earn 3 and 10% less in
1955 and 1969 with the former not.. significant. Initially I hadexpected
chores to be a proxy for "willingness to take on responsibility" and to
have a positive effect. Merton(3J however,argues that families who
insist on their children doing chores are lower middle class and are
very interested in conformity. He further argues that these families
will produce "tame" individuals who make the Ideal bureaucrat and who
receive less earnings than people In riskier jobs (seebelow). I might
add that Merton only refers to one piece of empirical evidence which,
he acknowledges, is not very compelling.
As might be expected time spent on chores and on part time job
are positively correlated (R2 =.13)but the differences in emphasis
of paid and family work reflect different types of environment and
different types of men.—44—
Thus far we have included SES measures which are strongly related
to family upbringing and taste formation. Parental income or wealth
can also influence a child's earnings by being used to purchase goods
that produce marketable skills, by being a proxy for nepotism, or by
being a proxy for genetically determined skills.
One possible proxy for family income is father's education, which
we have already indicated is not significant once business assets are
included in the equation. Another possible proxy is father's occupation
but this also does not explain directly much of the differences in
earnings, with the other variables held constant. There are, however,
several caveats that must be attached to this conclusion. First father's
occupation, (andresulting income) has an indirect effect on earnings
through the amount of schooling the respondent receives. Second and more
importantly, father being an owner is significant when the self employment
variables are not included. Third, in 1968 father's occupation and education
have a much greater impact on the range in family income than on earnings 4
ofthe head. This suggests that income inequality is perpetuated through
generations directly through financial inheritance( including business
assets) and indirectly through educational attainment. The biography
variable also includes some parental wealth indicators though it's not
clear what aspects of the variable determine earnings.
Two extremely important determinants of earnings which appear to
be proxiesfor large amounts of parental wealth, are type of elementary
and of high school attended. Those who went to private elementary school—45—
earned 13% more than those who attended public orparochial schools
or a combination of schools. (Thedifference is divided by the earnings
of the average nonself employed graduateof high school as is done
with the variables). The coefficient on privatehigh school is positive
but not significant, probably because22 of the 29 people who went
to private elementary school went to privatehigh school. Thus the
elementary school coefficients only measuresthe extra earnings above
private high school. Thosewho attended both private elementary and
high school in 1955 earn 29% morethan those who always went to public
schools. In 1969 those who went to private elementaryand private high
school earn 56% more than those whodidn't go to private school.
Since private schooling is both differentfrom and more costly
to the respondent's parents than publicschooling, it might be argued
that these results are due to qualitydifferentials. But if this
argument is accepted, it isdifficult to explain why in chapter
neither type of private school is significantlyrelated to our ability
measure, which contains somelearned knowledge.
Our explanation is that those who went to privateelementary schools
in the 1920's came from very wealthy families,who provide a good home
environment and/or genes or who used pull toaid their sons. The pull
argument seems to be the most likelysince the variable is primarily
a proxy for large amounts ofweath.67
67lndeed when we include a crude measure of net worth in our equations,
the private school variables become insignificantand much smaller.—46—
We are still left with explaining the change in the coefficientbet-
ween 1955 and 1969.I would argue that a screening sorting explanation
Casin chapter )isrelevant since even if nepotism is involved,you
want to see how good the person is before you give him an importantjob,
though of course a person can probably become vice presidentquicker if
his father owns the company.68
Another interesting finding in our equations thatsuggests nepotism
is that father—in--law's education, measured continuously inyears, is a
significant determinant of the respondent's earng in both 1955 and 1969.69
A primary explanation of these results is that business and socialcontacts
provided by father—in—law are important. But there can be other explanations.
For examples daughters from good--social backgroundsmay have the necessary
graces —notlearned in school —whichhelp to promote their husband.
Alternatively, women ith successful fathers may be able to spot andmarry
men with those characteristics that made for their father'ssuccess, or
push their husbands into achieving success.
Interestingly4 mother—in—law's education also is positively relate
to earnings in 1969 with the high school variable somewhatgreater than
the college variahle though the two are combined in the finalequation.
This finding makes ft less likely that women aremarrying men who are
liketheir fathers and suggests nepotism.
681nLiewelen'ssample of top corporate management, the men who can beidentified as related to the family who founded or havecontrolling interest
in 50 or the 70 largest industrial corporationsare (thesame age as/younger)
than the other people in the same or comparablepositions.
Thummyvariables br father—in—law's occupation andspouse's education
are not, significant.Table




Yearof firstfull time job —.11
•
—.15
Hoursworked,first job, 1969 .0l .07
Hoursworked,second job, 1969 —.03 —.12
Weekslost Illness, 1969 —.18
* Not significant at the 5% level.
The variables in this equation which hav been held constant include:
education, mathematical ability, various measures of socioeconomic back-
ground of the respondent and of his wife; information on self employment
and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience,
health, hours worked, marital status, and attitudes toward nonpecuniary
rewards.
I—47—
The other dimensions of SES we have tried but found to be insignificant
include: whether the respondent was the youngest or oldest sibling,
additional crude proxies for family wealth based ontype of house, the
labor force status of the respondent's niother when the respondentwas
less than 5 arid less than 14 years old; being reared on a farm; size of
city or town he grew up in; the region of the country in which raised,
and age at time of entry into school. These variables may be insignificant
because they are too crude proxies for the underlying mechanism being
sought.
Thus far we have been concerned with the effects of individualaspects
of SES on earnings. Except for religion none of these has an impact
as large as ability or education'on the range of earnings in 1955 or 1969.
But it is possible for a person to fall into the top or the bottomcategory
of all SES measures. Using the significant coefficients only, theaverage
differences in earnings for such "extremists" would total about $14,000
or 140 percent or the average earnings of the not self employed high school
graduate in 1969 and $5,500 or 90 percent in 1955 and far exceed the
direct effect of ability or education on earnings.70
Maturation and Work Experience
A well—known and docuniented result is that (real) earnings increase
with age till at least age 40. While we do not have data for allages,
the results for 1955 and 1969 certainly are in accord with this finding.
70m1s onky includes items in table3, business assets and some other
variables may be partly determined by SES.—48—
The general explanations for the upward sloping age earnings profiles
are (1) as people age, mental and physical maturation increasesthose
skills that determine earnings,(2)work experience and learning by doing
Increase earnings related skills,(3) people are promoted on the basis
of performance on the job and/or seniority ,(4) beyond a certain age
senescence sets in or skillsdepreciate.71
Without distinguishing for the moment type of work experience, time
on the job can be represented as TJ(Age —Yearof First Job —H)
where H represents such things as time not working because of illness,
unemployment and departures from the normal period of time to complete
a given level of schooling. If maturation is importantthan age should
have a separate effect from TJ. -.
Bothage and year of first job are significiant in1969 though
apparently senescence or depre ation has set in since age intable 4
is negative, but the separate age effectis nearly zero in 1955. The
year of first job coefficient can be treated asthe negative of the
experience coefficient. Thus contrary to most findings the absolute
value of the experience coefficient is greater later in life, i.e., the
function from 1955 to 1969 is not concave, even though we have deflated
by the CPI. However, between 1955 and 1969 the effect of years exper.ence
has only risen about 50% which is less than the percentage increase in
average earnings of nonself employed high school graduates orpeople with
71It is also possible that age is a proxy for particular cohorts. While
most people are within 7 years of one another, the youngest peopledid not
begin work till after serving in the military while many of theolder
people began work before World War II.—49—
any other education level. That experience is more important than maturity
in 1955 is not surprising given the evidence in Mincer. It is somewhat
surprising to find large senescence effects in 1969 since the discussion
in BloomLZisuggests little changes in intelligence and other skills before
age 50 and since weeks lost through illness have been held constant.72
However, the results may also be due to discrimination an account of age
for those who were fired in 1968 or 1969.
To try to refine the work experience measure, we included information
on military service after initial discharge, and type of work experience.
We find that the additional military experience data do not explain
Earnings, perhaps because military experience is a good substitute for
civilian experience or because, contrary to the above, experience on the
job is not important. In [LI 7]wefind that the earlier people enter
into high paying occupations, the more they earn in 1969 and thatsome
1955 jobs are better preparntions than others, depending on one's 1969
occupation. These results suggest that some some training is not general
and that some people were in wrong jobs in 1955 if they wanted to maximize
73 their lifetime earnings.
Earnings depend on houriy wages rates and hours worked. Unless
there is a backward bending supply curve of labor, higherwage rates
will lead to greater hours worked and more earnings.74 In 1969 each
we have not included those with zero earnings which would include
those (if any) retired or unemployed or mental or physical healthreasons.
73
The ranking of occupations is about the same in allyears; hence, if
you are going to be a manager in 1969, you should choose to be one earlier if
you have the option.
74Earnings =WH.Earnings/aW=H(1+c) where a=W3H/HaW. While this
is the usual way of viewing the problem, our equations relateEarnings to H.
aEarnings/H=W(1+1/a). With backward bending supplycurves,a might be negative.—50—
additional hour per week on the first job adds $70 to annual earnings.75
If we use an average hourly wage rate per week of $350, i.e., $l4,000/2,000
hrs. times 40 hours per week, we would estimate a in the footnote as about
—1.2. Each additional hour on the second job is associated with a $120
decrease in earnings apparently because some of those people with low
wages rates want higher materialstandards.76 Thus both results, which
rely on perhaps erroneous estimates of hours suggests that the supply curve
has some backward bending sections.
Despite the fact that the hours data refer to 1969, we included them
in 1955. The hours on second job are still significantly negative whi]e
the hours on first job have become negative and insignificant. It appears
that moonlighters work hard over long periods of time since hcurs on
second job is negatively related to recalled estimates of initial earnings
and to wife's working in 1968.
Weeks lost through illness in 1969 has a negative impact on 1969
and 1955 but only the 1969 coefficient is significant. The $180 per week
lost would indicate a $9,000 a year job if the figures exclude paid sick
leave, but we have no way of knowing if th is is how the question was inter-
preted. Incidentally, this variable caused the self assessed healthiness
variable used by TW to become insignificant.
75However, part of this earnings increase represents the substitution
of material goods for leisure. Unfortunately, the ho urs data which were
only collected in 1969, do not mesh perfectly with the earnings data since
the earnings in 1969 are those on main job only while we have separate estimates
for hours on first and second job. However, the 1968 earnings data, which
includes second job, gives similar results so that this caveat need not be
important.
76Secondary labor force particiipation Increases strongly with hours
worked on second job (bythe respodnent.).—51--
Nonpecuniary Rewards
There are monetary and nonmonetary rewards from a job. Since we
expect people to base their job choice decisions on the total of pecuniary
andnonpecuniaryrewards, those occupations which pay heavily in a non—
pecuniary form should have a compensatory change in wagepayments. We
do not have availabe measures of the nonpecuniaryaspects of various
occupations, but we do have some crude information related to the
preference of individuals on specific nonmonetary aspects of a job. For
example the respondents were asked," assuming that you thought that
the financial possiblities were about the same, wouldyou prefer to
work for yourself or for somebody else or no preference?"77 In 1955 fhose
who preferred to be salaried earn 6% less than the average( nonself
employed) high school graduate. See table 5. In 1969 the people who preferred
to be salaried earn 11% less. It is important to realize that these results
are from equations which hold constant being self employed and amount
of business assets.
We are interpreting the answer to the question as indicating risk
preference. Is this a reasonable interpretation? We discuss in some
detail in [ 1/ 7 ] how this variable could correspond to an econombst's
definition of risk aversion. We conclude there that in a formalsense,
if respondents thought like economists, the question woulddistinguish
additional question was asked in which" about the same" was re-
placed with "slightly favorable if you worked for yourself". This second
question was never significant given the first, but the first question always
yielded significant coefficients In the earnings equations of variouyears.—52--
between risk averters and fisk lovers. In a less formal sense people
may simply be responding to their belief that this occupation is risky.
This question was asked in 1969. It is possible that people who failed
in their work now choose the salaried answer because of their failure.
But in [ L/7J in chapter we show that this variable is not related
to a (self reported) measure of the difference between actual and expected
financial success. However, an alternative explanation of the question
might be that those who value being their own boss would earn less, eEpecially
since those who prefer independence in working do earn less(see below).
The results do not support the being your own boss explanation but this
may mean that this explanation does not dominate the risk interpretation
in this sample. While the resu1ts do not prove the risk interpretation
result, there is, however, some other evidence that bears on this issue
that tendt to corroborate it. As discussed in chapters in [ y7].
this same variable determines schooling, the amount of business assets,
and returns to capital in a manner consistent with risk preference.
Finally it is also worth reporting the variables is significant and has
the same sign in nearly all within occupation equations. Moreover, Wolfe
in her dissertation [ ],has found that those who prefer to be salaried
have less children, given income, etc., i.e, appear to be less willing
to risk having children.78
78These examples all assume that risk preference is a trait which is
exhibited in all acitivites. This assumption may be wrong. For example
some college professors may be risk lovers in the field of ideas but risk
averters in other matters.Table .5
Nonpecuniary Trade Of fs with E.irnings, Relative
to Salary of Average High School Graduate
1955 1969
Prefer to be Salaried —6% —10%
Teacher —10% —18%
Reasons for Taking 1972
Occup.Field when Starteda
Prospects of Future fin, success —9% —17%
ChanceforIndep. Work 5%* 11%
Person—to—PersonContact _2%*
Chanceto Help Others 8% 8%
Representeda Challenge 13%. —10%
Job Security 8% 13% -
FreeTime —1%*
Ia Each coefficient refers to a "no" for an answer ; hence, yes and the
no responses are the omitted group
*NotSignificant at the 5% level.
The variables in this equation which have been held constant include:
education, mathematical ability, various measures of socioeconomic back-
ground of the respondent and of his wife; information on self employment
and on teaching; a crude measure of risk preference, age and work experience,
health, hours worked, marital status, and attitudes towards nonpecuniary
rewards.—53—
Another set of questions asked in 1972 was "as best as you can remember,
what factors influenced your decision to enter the occupational field
you are in at the present time? Check yes or no to each of the following
and indicate factors that were of special importance."79 Since we felt
that the first three and last item in the footnote did not represent
nonpecuniary job aspects, we did not use them, nor any of the special
importance categories. In our equations the dummy variable for each
factor used was set at one if the respondent answered "no".
In 1969 the salary, person to person contact, and free time variables
were not significant though salary nearly was. The other variables
indicate that those who were not worried about future financial success
received 17% less than those who, were worried (ordidn't answer),
those not interested in independent work earn 10% more, those who wanted
to help others earn 8% less, those who wanted to have achallenge
earn 10% more, and those interested in job security received 13% less
earnings.8' In 1955 when many of the people were in different jobs and
even occupations, nearly all the same variables are significant and
all the signs on the variables significant in 1969 are the same though
the magnitude is always less than in 1969.
79me factors were: type of training in school, type of training in
military, personal contacts, salary offered, prospects of eventual financial
success, chance to do interesting work, chance for independent work, chance
for a lot of person to person contact, chance to help others, represented
a challenge, job security, provided a lot of free time, and always liked that
kind of work.
80The denominator as usual is the earnings of the average nonself employed
high school graduate. Ifthe current salary variable answer is included,
the coefficient is 10%.
81Tor those who want to tryto replicate these findings in other studies,
it is important to note that several of the variables, e.g., independence,
and helping others, were not significant by themselves but became significant
after the financial prospects variable was added to the equation.-54
Intuitively, all these results sern quite p1asible, and each one
is internally consistent with one another. But there still is the
question of whether these variables are related to nonpecuniary preferences.
This issue was discussed in detail in [ (717 ] wherL we concluded that
thevarjbles were probably related to preferences. This conclusion is
reinforced by the findings in chapters in 7) that the variables
have effects consistent with the above interpretation in other equations.
Moreover, the introduction of these variables has a big impact primarily
on the various graduate education variables, which seems quite reasonale
since we often think that Ph.D.'s etc. choose nonpocuniary rewards such
as independence in work or helping others.82
The basic threads running through these findings are that pepole
who are willing to work hard on difficult or risky projects will end
up with substantially more earnings while those who are more interted
in the intrinsic rewards of the job will receive less. While this is
hardly a startling conclusion, I know of no other study which has been
able to obtain significant impacts after holding constant such things
as education and ability. Moreover, the consistency of findings between
1955 and 1969 suggest that the 1972 vurvey responses are not expost
rationalizations and this is confirmed by the finding in chapter
that responses to these variables are not a function of exante/expost
differences in monetary success.
82For a few of thesevariables, the answers may represent an individuals'
recognition of his own limitations. For example, those who like to help
others may not have the aggressiveness to be a successful manager. But
then the variable represents skills that determine earnings.—55—
The trade off s of earnings with nonpecuniary returns is quite large.
Excluding the teacher dummy which is discussed below, but including all
the other significant soefficients in table 5, we find that the difference
in earnings due to various nonpecuniary preferences could be as high as
55% or $5,500 in 1969 and 40% or $2,500 in 1955.83 Since many of the
attributes or tastes involved could be correlated it is not clear that
we actually observe the extremes in this sample, but if we do then the
eféects are greater than all education differences except M.D.
The last nonpecuniary related variable we have used is being a
pre college teacher. We find that these people earn 10 and 18% less in
1955 and 1969. The premiumpaid to be a teacher is even larger before
the nonpecuniary variables are introduced, which seems reasonable. We
can not, however, rule Out the possiblity that teachers earn less because
they are less able.
Business Assets
The respoddents were asked for their "earnings" without the concept
being defined. But we would expect the self employed to report their net
income from their business since most people would ftnd it difficult to
separate earnings derived from labor from those derived from capital. To
trytohold constant the returns from capital, we have included a dummy
variable for self employed businessman, another dummy for self employed
professional, and most importantly a continous variable on amount of business
assets.84 Allofthese variables were only measured in 1969. The extra
831n this calculation we add together the absolute value of all thesig-
nificant coefficients.
also includes nonresidential real estate and other nonspecified
items. The variable Is crude since people were only asked to check one of
8 categories including "don't have" and over $80,000.—56—
measurement error involved in using these variables in 1955 undoubtedly
affects the comparability of our answers and our R2 though comparisons
of 1955 and 1969 equations which only use data available in both years
indicates that general conclusions on are not affected. We shall
interpret the coefficients on the buisiness asset variable as the rate
of teturn on financial capital invested in business.85
In 1969 the coefficient on the business asset variable, which is
an estimate of the before tax rate of return, is .12. Such a figure
is not unlike the 7 to 10 estimates usually found in studies such as Kravis
— 86,82
[o's.]. ihedummy variable for self employed businessman is
still significant though assets and hours worked are included in the
1969 equations, and equals 10% of the standardized base. The self employed
professionals, who may not have much in the way of financial investments,
receive 31% more than the nonself employed professionals, (though the
denominator is too low since for comparability, we have divided by the
average earnings of high school graduates).
85This interpretation, however, may be wrong for several reasons. Consider
the results obtained from regressing a person's earnings which equal wage
income plus returns from capital( assuming that education, etc. is held constant
by sample design). That is, we regress W + rk =cK. The expected value of
c would be equal to EE(w+rK) (K)IZK2=r +E(wK/K2).If wage income and business
assets are not correlated (linearly)the coefficient on K will be an unbiased
estimate of the returns from capital but if people with more capital also have
higher wage rates (education,etc. constant) then c is biased upwards
as an estimate of r.
86so the asset variale must be measured with error since people only
checked categories into which their assets fell and because the data was
taken from an asset breakdown and real estate holdings could be included
in the business asset line.
87Christenson [1 ]hasargued that because unincorporated businesses
do not have to pay the corporate income tax, a 7 to 10% return is consistent
with the 15% before tax return made by corporations.—57—
In 1955 the coefficient on 1969 business assets is still highly
significant (a"t" of ll)at .03 even though the growth of assets
must not have been uniform during the period and some people must have
changed their self epiploytnent/salaried status. Probably because of the
increased measurement error involved in using the 1969 asset and hours
variables in 1955, the 1969 self employment businessman dummy is as
important in 1955 as in 1969. On the other hand the 1969 self employed
professional dummy is not dignificant presumably becasue many of these
people were salaried in 1955 and not had a chance to display their true
worth to their employers.
Since we have only health related data from 1969, we will not compare
the results for variois years though the interested reader can consult
the equations in the appendix.
Conclusion
The many and varied comparisons made in this section lead to several
important conclusions. First the effects of nearly all variables change
during a person's life cycle and in general display a profile that increases
with age. Second the profiles are steeper for the education variables
than most other variables though as shown in more detail below the steepest
profile is for those who attended private elementary school. Third, even
after holding constant a wide variety of variables, we still find that
education leads to large and statistically significant differences in
earnings. These differences, however, are relatively small in comparison
with those arising from the conglomeration of family background, attitudes
and nonpecuniary preferences and are no larger than the differences due—58—
to ability.While wewillreturn to the topic below itisalso important
torealize that a brge portion of the differences in annualearnings are
duetounmeasured variables and random events.
V. Inequality: Extent and Causes
Inthis as in most samples, the distribution of earnings is skewedto
the right.88 Since most people assume that something called"ability" or
capacity isnormallydistributed, much attention has been paid to the
question ofwhy earningsexhibit a skewed distribution.89 Becker and
Mincer [?5 ] havedemonstratedthat such distributions can be generated
by "acquired" human capital models. Mandelbrot[ 3ii explainsskewness
solely in terms of many different inherited skills. Champernowe[ )C,
Aitch2sonand Brown[ t_], andothers have shown that stochastic processes
thatoperate continuouslycan enerate skewed distributions.90 In Friedman's
model, skewnessarisesfrom behavior towards risk rather than differences
in abilities. It is appropriate for us both to test varioushypothesis
generated by each theory to determine if the theory is correct and to
estimate the contribution of each theory or(more realistically)a set of
variables to earnings inequality.
Ineualitv in Earnings
Theinequality in earnings can be measured in several ways.91 One
important measure is the Lorenz curve, which indicates thepercent of
88See Lydall.[ or Kravis[ 7I forsurveys of other samples. Lebergett
suggests that among full time males who are not self employed, the earnings
distribution in 1959 approaches normality. For somepurposes, however, the
self employed and unemployed should be included in theearnings distribution.
89
There is little direct evidence on the diltribution ofcapacity. I.Q.
scores, for example, are generally scored so as to be normally distributed.
90For an excellentsummary of all these models, see Mincer [3 I.
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total earnings received by the top X%. The Lorenz curves for 1955
and 1969 are presented in figure 1. -Alsodrawn in that figure is
a diagonal which is the Lorenz curve that would be observed if each
personhad the sameearnings.Inall years studied earnings are not
distributedequallyand are below the diagonal.
All summary measures of relative inequality of two Lorenz curves will
92
yield the same rankingprovided the two curves do not intersect.
Conversely,if the curves intersect, there always are some measures that
would disagree on whether curve 1 or 2 is more unequal. Sánce earnings
do not follow any well known distribution, we have used the nonparaxnetric
Kolmogorov—Smirnov test (KS) to determine if the difference in the
Lorenz curves is statistically significant. Results of the KS test in-
dicate that the 1969 curve is statistically different from (moreunequal
than) the 1955 curve.
We also have examined the Lorenz curves for various education and
mental ability gpg•3 In either 1955 or 1969, the Lorenz curves
for any two mutually exclusive groups, such as high school and some
college, were never significantly different at the 5 percent level though
many were at the 10 percent level. For any particular group, the 1969
curve always was beneath the corresponding 1955 curve and the maximum
92See Atkinson [3 1.
93Theeducation and ability groups are those defined in chapter—60--.-
differenceswhich range from 6 to 10 percentage points were always significant
at the 5 percent level. Thus there is ]:1 difference in inequality
in earrdngs between various education and hUitygroupsin any year
butmore inequality in each case in 1969 than in 1955.
From Variance to Kurtosis
Thus far we have indicated that earnings inequality has varied from
yjarto year. For many purposes, however, it is necessary to ask how
particular features of the distribution havechangedover time and to
what extent these features and their chance are the consequence of the
distributionof education, mental ability, etc. A quantifiable and
attimes decomposable description of adistribution can be obtained
fromvarious 'tmoments'1 of the distribution.94 The first four moments
iieasure the mean, variance, skev'ness, and kurtosis of the distribution.
In 1969 our standard deviation,o, is 9•4•95 In some types of labor
markets we would expect 0toincrease when average earnings did. For
these cases a standardized measure is provided by the coefficients of
: variation, 0/mean, •which is about 2/3 in 1969.
Several measures of syirmetry have been prcposed in the literature.
To avoid reranking the observations as we hold constant education and
will assume that the expected values of the first four moments
can be estimated from the actual value. This need not be true. For
example, if the distribution were }areto, the expected value of the variance
wouldbe infinite though a number couldbe obtained from the data.
95roinsure comparability with the regression results, and to save
on costs, the 1955 and 1969 statistics are based on the approximately
4600people who reported earnings in both years.Table 6
Moments of Earns and LN Earnings in 1955and1&J69
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othersets of variables, we will use the third moment standardized by
the second'to eliminate scale effects. A distribution is skewed to
the right when this measure is positive, as is our 1969 estLnate of
3.0. At the 5% level we can reject the null hypothesis that the
population is normally distributed which is symmetric, using a test
developed by Fisher.
Kurtosis measures the frequency of observations in the tail or
near the mean of the distribution. We use the fourth moment di'ided
(standardized) by the second. From this ratio we subtract 3 which is
the ex-pected value of the kurtosis in a normal distribution. Larger
values such as our 12, indicate that there are too many observations in
the tails or too few near the mean as compared with the normal curve.
In 1955 mean earnings are $7,300 (in 1958 prices). The standard
deviation is $3.8 and the coefficients of variation is about 1/2. Our
skewness and kurtosis estimates are 5.4 and 62.0 respectively, neither
of which would be in accord with the null hypothesis that the distribution
is normal. Thus in both 1955 and 1969, the distribution ofearnings is
skewedto the right and has larger numbers of people in the tails.
Given the differences .between our sample and the U.S. population,
theresults on the various inequality measures inany one year have—62--
restrictedinterest until we control for education, ability, etc. But
thechangesduring the 14 years are of substantial interest —especially
since such data are not generally available over such a time span and
so late in the life cycle.
Between 1955and1969 mean earnings in constant dollars grew by
about 100%. Since the standard deviation increased by.a greater amount
than themean,the coefficients of variation increased by
27Z.96 The changes in the skewness and kurtosis measures are both negative.
Thus contrary to the usual interpretationf stochastic theories, the
distribution isbecoming'lessasymmetric and less deviant from a norn1
/
curveas the people age (thoughthe 1969 curve is far from a normal curve).
One skeweddistribution that has been used to describe the earnings
distribution is the lognormal. The skewness and kurtosis results for
the log of earnings in table 1 are not consistent with the null hypothesis
97
that earnings in 1955 or 1969 are distributed log normally.
Sources of Variance, Skewness and Inequality
Our sample is, of course, better educated, mentally more able, probably
less risk averse, and more limited in age than the population. Since all
96Qivenourearlier results on (nonintersecting) Lorenz curves and Atkinson's
theorems,the coefficients of variation and thestandard error,hich are measures
ofinequality must increase.
TCareful analysis of nationwide random samples has generally concluded
that the earnings do not follow the log normal distribution for high levels
of income, but probably because of the restricted distribution of
education,mental ability and age in our sample, the deviations from log
normalcy (ona chart not shown) are greater and occur over a wider range
of earnings in this sample.—63—
thesecharacteristics affect earnings and haveadistribution different
thanin the population, there is no reason to expect tofind that the
distribution of earnings is the sameasthat in the population. Despite
this we can still use thesample to study problems of interest. For
exale,suppose the true equaLion in the popu1atiis
l)YXa+u
where X is a vector of (measured)independent variables, a the associated
vector of coefficients and u. are errors arisingfrom random events
and unmeasured variables. Because our distribution of theX's differs
98
from the population, we have an unequally weighted stratifie3d sample.
As long as the U's are distributed the same as in the population, we can
studythe distribution of Y —Xau to determine what the population
distribution would he if everyone had the same education, ability etc.
In examining the sources of various aspects of inequality,several
things must be noted. First since the equation'scoefficients are
selectedso as to minimize the variance of the residualswith no
attention given to the skewness or kurtosis, the results Consources)
99
are less reliable for these latter two measures than forthe variance.
is well known that such samples yield unbiased estimates of the
a's. Thus we can use the equations we have 'developed to examine the
effect of the various X's, on earnings, for the range of each X in the sample.
Since most of our variables are (zero,one) dunnues, our cothficients
are estimates of the mean in various cells. Provided ouimodel specifications
including interactionandhomoskedasticity are correctthe residuals
represent the distribution within various cells and canbe used to study
skewness and kurtosis.Table 7
Sources of Iuequau ty in 1969 and 1955
[Stand a
Error



































































































he Y1 through Y8series are based on equationin tables
=allvariables
2
=educationcoefficients, including M.D. and L.L.B., and the Gourmanrating =mentalability variables
=businessassets, and the self employed businessmen and professional dunmies
=preferto be salaried and the 4 other nonpecuniary variables
6
=age,year of first job, hours iorkcd, hours on second job
time spent, private schools, in law, biography, religion, size of currenttown, never move variables
=teacher,no response in '72, weeks lost from illness, age entered school, religious

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Second de ite this caveat,theeffects of the Xs on skewness and kurtosjs
100
might be larger thmnthoseonvariance.
Table3 contains estimat.s for 1969of the standarderror, skewness,
and kurtosis with tlie latt:er two standardizedby the standard error
101
raised to the appropriate power. This stnndardization is appropriate
since we are primarily interested in thequestion of whether the
distribution would benormalor would be such less skewed if ability,
etc., were the same for evetyoi,e. &itvariableswhich reduced the
residualswill also reduce u3or u4; thus, the resultingseries could
—3 be as skejed though Y.—Y) would be smaller.
We present theestimatesfor earnings (Y) and residual earnings,
(Y_X*a)where X*a refers to a subset or all of the variablesused in the
equation in table Al .Ifwe had estimated an equation with just X
I
generallywe would have obtained different estimates of thesecoefficients.
But since such coefficients would be biasedestimates of. the true parameters,
itwas felt that it was better to use the estimates from thecomprehensive ].02
equation.
lUu
Forexamplesupposethat the variablebeing considered is a zero
one dummy variable, Z.Theones in the Z variable could allbe located
just so thateliminating the effect of Z would eliminate completelyany (nonnormal)kurtosis in the earnings distribution.Similarly the Z
variable could be the sole source of skewness ina distribution. Finally
since most of our variables have been transformedinto dumrrv-variab1es,
the effects of say schooling dependon the distribution of people by
education level and their coefficients.
Kendall and StuartL ZY3.
1-1owever,part of the effects of sayeducation may be appearing in
other coefficients whose variables arepartially determined by education.—65—
Using the most comprehensive equation available, the standard
error of the residual earnings is reduced by about 18% to $7.8 in
row 2 of table 3. The remaining rows in the table, identified atthe
bottom, indicate the effects of various sets of variables. For
purposes of reference, Y2 will hc called education, Y3mental ability,
self employment, Y5 nonpecuniary trade offs, Y6 worlr related experiences,
Y7 socioeconomic standing, and miscellany. The reduction in the
standard errors indicate the partial R 's —ignoring sign -ofthese
variables but because reductions in variance depend upon the covariance
of the independent variable, the effects of the individual rows .are not
additive.
The self employment data reduces the standard error,a, by 8% with
businessassets beitg the most important single variable. The SES
variables reduce a by 5%. The quantity and quality of education
variables CincludingM.D. and L.L.B .)reduceo by less than 4% and all
other sets of variables have even smaller impacts on a. The percentage
reductions in a are, incidentally, the partial R 's for each set of
103
variables.
In the sample, the standardized skewness measure is 3.05. As
shown in the Y —row,the full set of variables reduces the skewness
104
by 10% to 2.76. Thus even if education, ability, SES, business assets,
etc. were equal for all individuals, the earnings distribution would be
about 90% as skewed as originally once we adjust for the reduction in
the moments in table 3 are calculated about the mean that
applies to each row.
1041he reduction in Z(u.3) is about 50%.—66—
variance from holding each of these itemsconstant.
Interestingly when education, ability, the nonpecuniary trade offs,
are individually held constant, th standardized skewnessmeasure increases
between 1 and 5%. On the other hand, the selfemployment variables
reduce the relative skewness by 7% and the miscellaneousvariables in
reduce skewness 1%.
Thus we can conclude that if everyone in thesample had the same
education or ability or nonpecuniary preferences, theearnings distribution
would have slightly more skewness. 105 We can also concludethat difference
in self employment (sizeof business assets and being self employed)
have contributed greatly to the existing skewness in thedistribution in
this sample.
Now let us examine kurtosis. In the sample the standardizedkurtosis
measure had a value of 13.9 which is far from and significantly differen
106,107 from the zero expected in the normal distribution. The standardized
kurtosjs measure based on the residuals from equation 2, isincreased
by 6%. Looking at the other rows, we find that only holdingconstant
self employment and the miscellany inY8 has lead to a reduction in relative
kurtosis. Even with self employment held constant thedistribution
105Thisincrease is partly due to the distribution of people in each
category, e.g., nearly rectangular over the educationgroups and in the
ability and SES instances, and partly to thepattern of the coefficients.
We have already subtracted 3 which is the value if thedistribution
is normal.
107
4 The unstandardized measure of kurtosis, u.
,woulddecline
.ubstantia1ly, but even with the initial variance the distribution would
not be normal.Table g
Sources of Inequality in 1969 and 1955
































































including M.D. and L.L.B., and the Gourinan rating
employed businessmen and professional dummies
prefer to be salaried and the 4 other nonpecuniary variables
age, year of first job, hours worked, hours on second job
time spent, private schools, in law, biography, religion, size of current town,
never move variables
=teacher,no response in '72, weeks lost from illness, age entered school, religious





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects of Various Ses of Variables on Inequality
By Five Ability Levels
1955
1.
AbilityFifth Standard SkewnessKurtosis Standard Skewness Kurto
Error Error
Bottom 1/5—
1 2.91 2.92 14.79 7.81 3.39
j17.89
1 —Y 2.67 I1.90 9.54 6.71 2.98 20.23
I — 2.88 2.89 14.96 7.60 3.55 19.83
—,.2 2.83 2.45 12.36 7.24 3.29 20.36
Y — 2.85 2.94 15.27 7.61 3.45 18.49
I — 2.91 2.81 13.84 7.76 3.40 17.96
1 — 2.83 2.64 12.60 7.68 3.25 17.48





































































































































2.91 2.92 14.79 7.81 3.39 17.89
3.90 5.39 49.39 9.14 3.50 17.95
3.32 3.02 13.73 9.06 3.36 16.44
3.82 3.80 23.84 9.66 2.77 11.42
4.50 7.27 95.12 10.26 2.77 11.29
LN Earnings
:tom 1/5 .36 •73 1.60 .47 .84 1.36 1/5 .38 .86 3.58 .49 .87 1.20 11/5 1 .37 .68 2.30 .47 .89 1.56 1/5 .39 .63 2.67 .50 .59 .61 1/5 .38 .82 3.61 .49 .40 1.12
STable 13
Effects of Various Sets of Variables on Inequality































































4.30 5.37 51.00 9.79
3.87 5.25 53.81 8.32
4.29 5.30 51.17 9.72
4.30 5.38 50.98 9.75
4.14 5.33 52.'67 9.02
4.25 5.45 52.48 9.58
4.29 5.39 51.45 9.72
4.13 5.30 51.18 9.37




















4.25 6.30 77.92 9.64
3.93
i 6.94 99.70 8.38
4.23 6.36 79.06 9.58
4.22 6.34 78.52 9.60
4.13 6.41 85.69 9.02
4.19 6.40 79.79 9.50
4.22 6.40 80.63 9.50
4.15 6.53 83.65 9.35














































1initi.onsseetable 3 of this chapter.
low should rep ttherow for Y. The small recorded change occursbecause a few people




























of earnings would exhibit kurtosis. On the otherhand, the elimination
of education differences leads to a big increasein kurtosis. This
suggests that education pushes more poele away from the mean and makes
for a smoother transition to the tails whose existenceis not related
to education.
1955
Our analysis of the source of Inequality in 1955earnings distribution
is handicapped by the fact that several ofour 1Tost important variables —
includingthe self employment ones —aremeasured only in 1969 and must
have changed between 1955 and 1969. Nevertheless, letus examine the
same statistics on inequality. As shown in table 3, the standarderror
of earnings In 1955 is $3.8 Cthousandsof 1958 dollars). Since the
1955 equation has a smaller the standard error of Y — hasonly
been reduced by 10%. The standard error ofearnings is reduced by about
1 1/2 to 3% by each of education, ability, riskpreference and nonpecuniary
variables, work experience, SES, and the miscellany inY8 but the self
employment variables reduce the standard deviation by 4%.
The 1955 skewness measure is 5.3 which is muchgreater than in 1969.
Examining the various rows, we find that holding constantany subset
(except work experience and the miscellany) of the whole set ofthe
108
characteristics in equation 2 increases relative skewness.
10rhe major differencebetween the 1969 and 1955 results for the
self employment variables may well be due to themeasurement problem,
i.e., some in the 1955 right hand tail in 1955 are no longer selfemployed
in 1969 while some with large business holdings in 1969were not yet
self employed.Table 1/i








At Least Some Grad.
2.81 2.87 13.68 7.12 3.59 21.36
4.30 5.37 51.00 9.79 3.29 15.20
4.25 6.30 77.92 9.64 2.81 11.50
3.33 2.53 10.29 10.02 2.96 12.73
LNEarnings













1.52 .48 .54 1.31—68--
Much th same pattern appears on kurtosis. Theresiduals from the
full or any. partial set of variables (exceptthe miscellany) have
greater standardized kurtosis than in the originalearnings data and
this kurtosis is greater in 1955 than in 1969.
Pattern by Education Level
Since we have eliminated theaverage difference in earnings for people
with different amounts of education,ability, etc. ,theabove analysis
essentially analyzes the between cell contribution ofeducation, ability,
etc. to inequality. For severalpurposes it is important to study inequality
withinvariouseducation and ability cells. As shornintable 4, in
1955 the standard error is lowest for those withjust ahighschool
education, at the peak for those who started orcompleted college, and
109 intermediate for those with more formal education thana bachelor's degree.
The relative skewness and kurtosismeasure increases sharply from high
school through a bachelors degree and then fallsto their lowest level
for those with at least some graduate work. Ineach education group neither
earnings nor the log of earnings are distributednormally.
In 1969 it is still true thattheearnings distribution is neither
normal nor lognorrnal.In other respects, the pattern is much different
than in 1955. While high school graduates stillhave the lowest standard
error, graduate students (including M.D.'s and L.L.B.'s) have thehighest.
The skewness and kurtosis measures aregreatest for high school graduates
109
Thereare from 950 to 1330 people In each cell.—6•9—
and then decrease through the bachelors levelfollowed by a slight
increase at the graduate level. The major changein the high school
category between 1955 and1969requires comment. We suggest thatthe
above average growth in the standard error andthe large absolute and
comparative increases in the skewness andkurtosis measures occur
because even the talented or lucky individual among highschool graduates
110
find that it takes longer to get to the top. Thus in 1955 these
people would not be so far out in the righthand tail as they are in 1969.
Perhaps because of a different distributionof talent among the more
educated, because of credentialism based oneducation or because of
nepotism, this same phenomenon does not occurin other education classes,
More light can be shed on these and other issues byexamining the
distribution of the residuals in each education class.Since we are
not able to find significant differencesinthe coefficients by ability
or education level we can use the same setsof coefficients as previously
.111
in making these calculations.
Consider first the 1955 results in table 5. Ateach education level
the standard error declines by about 10%, with the self employment
variables (Y —Y4)
generally responsible for the largest reductionin
the standard error and the SES(Y —Y.7)
and nonpecuniary trade offs
(Y—Y5)variables nearly as Important.
1The privateeducation variables, which we hink are a proxyfor
nepotism, have bigger range effects and partial R'Sin1969 than in 1955.
11•That the coefficients do not differ significantly, of course, tells
us nothing about the pattern of inequality inthe residuals as education varies.—70—
In all but the bachelors group, holding the selfemploymentvariable
constant causes a reduction in the relative skewnes r'easurg. The
opposite is true in table 4 for the total aple. It eems likely that
thiB difference is duo to the use of a sepnrate stfmdardization factor
in each education level or in other words the total. ;unple combines
within education distributions i'hich have different pirarneters. In the
high school and graduate level, kurtosis dicreases hen self employment
is held constant while the oppo.itc is true at the other two education
levels. No other set of characti.ristics hrs a large impact on skewness
or kurtosis in 1955 at more than one education level.
In 1969 the picture is more varied. The standard error of Y —
is.nearly identical for all but the high school category which remains
the lowest and much of the difference in skewness and to a lesser extent
kurtosis disappears. At each education level holding constant the self
employment variable substantially reduces the standard error and the
relative skewness but only the high school and bachelors degree estimates
of relative kurtosis. Once again SES and nonpecuniary variables play an
important secondary role in deterr.ining the standard error but have little
effect on skewness and kurtosis.
Mental Ability
Since very little information has ever been presented about the
distribution of earnings by mental ability, it is appropriate to repeat
the above analysis by the 5 ability levels. Table 6 contains the distribution—71—
112
statistics for earnings and the log earnings for each abilityfifth.
In 1955 the standard error is lowest for the bottom fifth and highest
for the top. The middle fifth, however, has a lower standard error and
coefficient of variation than the group on either side. Since the standard
error of the log of earnings does not vary with ability, theabove
results may be due to a few extreme observations —asis also suggested
by the skewness and kurtosis meanure. Both skewness and kurtosisfollow
the same pattern, with highest values in the top 1/5th; however, none of
the earnings distributions within an ability cell are normal or lognormal.
In 1969 thestandarddeviation follows the same pattern as in 1955
(though the largest fifth has the lowest coefficient of variation).
Skewness and. kurtosis are substantially lower in the top 2 fifths than
in the lowest 3; however, none of the distributions are normal or lognornal.
Table 7 presents the inequality pattern by ability level once other
variables have been held constant. As we have consistently found in 1955,
the self employment variables cause the biggest reduction in the standard
error in most ability fifths with the SES and nonpecuniarY trade offs
contributions almost as large. In 1969 holding self employment constant
substantially reduces the standard error and skewness.
At first glance the inequality pattern seems confusing. For example
when comparing the education results, we find high school to be (about)
112
It is important to remember that the ability measures is more
mathematical than a standard I.Q. measure and that to be in the sample
a person had to score in the top half of the Air Cadet Qualifying Test.
The 1/5ths, therefore, are more like tenths for the U.S. population.—72—
113 thelowest on skewness and kurtosis in 1955 but the highest in 1969.
A similar reversal occurs in the ability .results.
A sorting uncertainty model can be used to explain these reversals
and other results contained in tables 4 and 6. As explained earlier
the basis of this model is that it is difficult to measure in advance
a person's capacity to perform in various jobs. Firms also do not use
piece pay rate perhaps because of difficulty in measuring one person's
prdductivity andofinterdependencies within production lines or heirarchial
structures. Firms, therefore, initially assign people to particular jobs
on the basis of certain"objective' criteria such as education, marital
status, military record, etc. and certain "subjective" criteria such
• 114
as rformance on an interview. In addition appointment may be based
on discriminatic as evidenced by race, gender, or "parental pull".
Since firms know that the above criteria or signals are fallable,
they continually monitor performance on the job to base decisions on
fire, retain, and promote. Average initial earnings may be fairly uniform
when studied by objective criteria, because of morale problems associated
with different pay for the same position and because at low level jobs
a person has little chance to use initiative or display productivity outside
115
of a narrow range. People with more potential capacity perform better
are promoted faster and have a higher growth rate in earnings, However,
113
Since the adjustments for the other variables never change the rank
order on any inequality measure, we will base our statements on the inequality in Y.
i14
'The criteria used may vary dependIng on supply of the "best"groups
relative to total demand.
-Therestillcan be a wide variance within say education groups because
initial position obtained may depend on nepotism, being at the right place
at the right time, or because of the importance of subjective criteria.- 73.-
promotionS occur somewhat randomlybecause the particular vacancies
a person is qualified for occurirregularly because a person'stalent
may not be recognized at onceif he t?b1oomsI late, and because family
connections or "nepotism" results in faster promotionsfor equally
116
qualified persons.
Now how does this mode1 with somecther considerations, explain
the previous findings. First high schooi graduateshave less objective
credentials and probably less parent pul.1then the more educated,
and start at lower rungs in the careerladder. By 1955 the high school
graduates have made some progressbut thoy have not yet made it to
those positions such as manacr cisuccessfulbusiness owner at which
117
salaries are very high. Thus in l5 high school graduates have
a smaller standard error, skewness,and kurtosis than those with some
college and a hachelors degreeLesLs€sor: n the latter two groups
118
have received promotions to very responciLiepositionS. By 1969, when
the men are about 47 years e1, firmshave sorted out people by capacity
thus the talented high school graduate hasreceived his promotions and
is at or near his potential c:Lpacit; atage •.Butthe distribution
of talent in the high school group is differentthan in the other groups
with relatively few such tariented pcopl amongthe less educated. This
LlWise [5Ihas exaudned the effects of such a system onthe variance
of earnings using a Iarkov model.
U/pay does not increase linearly with position. See Lydall [30). For
some specific evidence on corpotat:eexecutives see Taubman—WalesI YC.], app., chpt.
118The graduate c'ol resu'ts reciin:: interest here since M.D., lawyers,
andteachers ho have monopoly rcrrn. ai nonpecuniary rewards aremixed in.-.74--
difference arises frr several reasons. Forexaple the more talented
partly inherit their capacity from successfulparents whoencourage
them to get more education.119 Secondsome sources of their capacity,
(such as drive and creativity),may lead to academic leanings and
scholarhips. Third for most people educationmay be a necessary ingredient
in the formation of capacity.
Now, how do we explain the ability results? Aplausible argument
can be made that the mental abIlity measure, weuse is cor,related with
types of cognitive and to a lesser extent noncognitive skills.
Following
the lines of the above argument, we wouldexpect skewness and kurtosis
for the less able to be relatively low in 1955 andhigh in 1969. Comparing
the bottom and top fifths, we find thisto be the case. However, table
8 also indicates very large valuesof skewnessand kurtosis in the 2nd
fifth in 1955 and an extremely large incease forthe top fifth. This
is notthe only time we will find something unusualabout these two ability
fifths. In [5j in chapter we paint out the average amount of income
from capital is greatest in these twogroups. This suggests that through
inheritance (financialcontrol ,or nepotism), men in thisgroup were
able to reach high positions quickly.
While we can construct a plausible explanation ofthe changes in
inequality measure on the basisof a sortinguncertainty model, .other
theories are also consistent with the results.For example Mincer'[ 3I
19Seechapter .Also,in this sample educational attainment is
related to date of marriage, but aperson with wealthier families may have
been able to affordboth marriage and education.—75—




Where o2(YP) isthevariance in peak earnings
o2(Yj) isthevariance in earnings in the overtaking year
ris therate of return on post school invest:ment
a2(CT) is the variance. inthesum of post school investment
02(Es) is the variance in initial post school earningscapacity
p is the correlation betweendollar investments in schooling and
post school investment
We will discuss the issue in moredetailin chapterbut it is
approximately true that 1955 corresponds tothe overtaking year,( in
anyevent o2(Yt)willincrease with t if pis positive). Thus Mincer's
interpretationofthe faster growth in a between 1955 and1969for high.
• 120
school graduates is that either p or o(CT)/cr(ES)is greater for these people.
Skewness in Mincer's model arises primarily fromthe correlations
betweenthe means and variances of earnings (withineducation cells)








Thefaster growth rate for lighschool graduatesis evident in the
adjusted and unadjusted estimates of76—
where p1 and p2 are the correlations between E2s andCT and Es and
C2T respectively. Generally speakingp1 and p2 will have the same
3 3. 3 3 sign as p; hence, a would certainly exceed o Yj if a (CT) and a
ES
are the same sign. The theory would also suggest that the faster
the growth in variance within education levels, the faster the growth
in skewness provided the last term is about th1 satneat all education
121
levels. This is borne Out in our sample. The findings are not in'-
consistent with Mincer's model and indeed can notbemade so since o3CT
can varybyeducation level.
izi.
itistoo tedious to analyze the growth ir)2the standardized measure
of skewness in Mincer's model since 3(\/2)3' will have to be squared
to eliminate the square root in the er\omfncor.—77-
!individua1 Stability in the Earnnc'sDistribution
Whilemanyof our findings are based on variables notpreviously
used in studies of earnings, in priaip1e the same phenomenacould
be examined for different cohorts in Census typesamples. The longitudinal
data in our sample also permit us to extend ourunderstanding
of the dynamic evolution of the earningsdistribution and to analyze
the relationship of annual to lifetime earnings byexamining the stability
of an individual's position in the earningsdistribution over time.
The empirical facts on stability and change over along time span
are very valuable in themselves sincethe distribution of lifetime
earnings is more important for many purposesthan that of any one years
earnings. But equally important-thesefacts allow us to test and thus
to have a chance to reject certain earnings'distribution theories,
as described below.
Individual Stability and Chanin the EarningsDistribution
To examine fndividual stability in the distribution,we have calculated
the "transition probability matrix" for the peoplewho reported earnings
in both 1955 and 1969. Table 1 indicates the percentageof people who
ended up in any tenth of the 1969 earnings distributionfrom any given
122
• tenth in the 1955 distribution. For example, of the people with the
122rhere are not exactly 10% of the sample in each row or column for
two reasons. First the dividing points werefound for all respondents
with nonzero earnings in thesample while some individuals were notincluded
inthis table, primarily because they did not report earningsin both
years. Secondly, in a few instances, a largenumber of people reported
earnings equal to the dividing poiflt. Whilewecould randomly allocate
people to each adjoining class t) ill it, it was simplerand not misleading















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lowest 10% of the earnings in 1955,i196939% were still at the bottom,
an additional 30% could be found between the10 and 30% percentiles,
and less than 9 percent have moved
up into the top 30 percent of the distribution.
As a simple (ordinal)measure of stability we can use theaverage percentile
position, which has risen from 5 to 26% by 1969.
For contrast consider the people in thetop 10% in 1955. In 1969
44% were still in the top 10%,an additional 35% were in thenext, 20%
of the distribution, arid only 4% hadfallen below the 30th percentile.
The average percentile position hadfallen from 95 to 80% in 1969.
In the other lOths in 1955,people tend to be close to their
starting position with, for example, from 39 to 64%of the people falling
within the same or neighboring tenthsof the distribution. Notmore than
30% of the people in therow lie above the 70th percentile in 1969until
we reach the 60—70% interval in 1955 whileat least 30% of the row fall
below the 30th percentile in 1969until we reach the 50—60% intervalin
1955. The average percelitilestanding in 1969 for each tenth in 1955
rises Continuously but onaverage people who were in the bottom 40% in 1955
have a higher percentilestanding in 1969 while the reverse is truefor
123,124
those in the top 60% In 1955.
As shown in table 2, between 1955and 1969 about 1% of the people
suffered a decline in nominalearnings, and 15% had a growth of less than 125
75%.For almost 50% of the sample,earnings grew between 75and 175%
1 omeof this difference
may reflect attenuation since those in the bottom tenth can not fall butcan rise in 1969 etc.
124
In all but one comparison, theKS test would reject the hypothesis thateach rowis distributed the same as itsadjacent rows. 5Iu this section weusenominal earnings rather than theconstant dolLLr onesusedInthe earlier chapters. Thischange i madebecausethe deteinjinatlonof the cut off pointswas done, early on,in current dollars. Deflationwould notchangethe oattern nr—79—
while for 3% earnings grew in excess of500%. Using individual ob-
servations, the average percentage changeis 175% and the average annual
compound growth rate between 1955 and1969 as 4.7% which over 14 years
is equivalent to an increase of about 90%.(There is no reason to
prefer one measure to the other).
Of the people who were in the second tenthof earnings in 1955:
1% had a decrease in (nominal) earnings; nearlyl6%(the mode) had a
gain between 125 and 150%; while 8.5%had a growth in excess of 300%.
The average growth rate in earnings in this tenthis 176%.
Of the people in the BOth to 90th percentile in1955: nearly 5%
had a decrease in their nominal earnings; themode is in the 75 to 100%
interval; and 14.5% had a growth rate in excessof 300%. The mean
growth rate in the next to bottom, and next to toprowe are identical,
but there are more people in both tails of thedistribution in the 80th
to 90th percentile, and the two distributions aresignificantly different
at the 5% level (K.S. test).
In all but the two extreme rows, the mean growthin earnings only
ranges from 151 to 176% and the compoundrates .045 to .051. However,
those whose earnings placed them in the top 70 to90% in 1955 have
distributions which are significantly different (K.S.test, 5% level)
with more people in both tails than those in the bottom10—50%. In
the bottom tenth the mean change is 267% with a heavyconcentration in
the right hand tail. In the top tenth, the mean changeis only 143%
and there is a heavy concentration in the left handtail.—80—
Distribution of Growth Rates by Education Level
Tables 3—6 contain the growth rate distributionsfor each of 4
126
education levels. Since in these tables cutoff points for the tenths
are those for the entire sample, we maycompare the corresponding rows.
In the 10 to 20th percentile, about 68,57,45, and36% of people with
hih school, some college, a bachelors degree, and at leastsome
graduate training had earnings increases nogreater than 150%. The
average growth in earnings increases with education for people with
the same earnings in 1955. Despite therelatively small sample sizes
within each of these 1955 percentiles, the KStest rejects the hypothesis
that the cumulative distribution of,say, the second and ninth rows are
the same in each education level..
For any one educational level, the resultsare similar to those given
for the whole sample in table 2.That is except for the top and botto
rowi, the mean percentage change is independent of earnings percentile in
27
1955. The people at the bottom in 1955 have thehighest growth rate
while those at the top in 1955 have the lowestgrowth rate Cexceptfor
the high school category). Within each education levelthose with high
earnings in 1955 tend to have distributions with agreater percentage of
people in both tails than people with low incomes.
Despitethe relatively
126We used educationas reported in 1969. The distribution of
education in 1955 is different because of thepost 1955 education received
by about 8% of the sample.
127
There is however, a tendency in each of the tablesfor the average
compound growth rate to decrease with 1955 earningspartly because of
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few observations, within these tables, the differences in the distribution
by row are significant. Thus we can conclude that results in table 2
don't occur because high school graduates are more concentrated in the
lower percentiles in 1955.
In the appendix, we present several equations in which the dependent
variable is (Y69 —y55)/Y55.(The reader who wishes to examine the
determinants of Y69 —Y55can do so by subtracting the 1955 regression
from the 1969 one). The first equation contains all the variables used
in the final equations. for 1955 and 1969 in chapter 4. The second
equation adds Y55 to the first.
We will concentrate first on the second equation which contains Y55
and which has an R2 of .20. The1nclusion of Y55 in our equation means
that we have held constant all theother systxnatic determinants of Y
and its percentage change including luck and K55 —155 where 1(55 is the
stock of investment in one the job training and 155 is the investment in
128,129
that year. But the coefficients on the other variables in this
equation represent the effect of each variable on the growth rate, net
of the effects passed on through Y55.
The higher is a person's 1955 earnings the slower is his growth rate.
128
We have expressed the on the job training variable in this way to
be in accord with Mincer's model, as explained below.
129
It can be demonstrated that if we compare the estimates of
YXd + ZeandY =Xf+ (Z + Xb)g that our estlm&tes of g and e
would be identical while the estimate of f would equal that of d —bg.—82—
The coefficient of —.09 is highly significant with a "t"valueof 19.
As just explained, the coefficient on the earnings variable represents
the effect of all the unmeasured variables. Results presented later would
suggest that one of the unmeasured variables that is important is luck.
The on the job training variable, K55 —155,may also be important though
tests of the theory presented below tend to conflict with Mincer's theory.
Previous research based on crosssection data has shown .that age
earning profiles tend to be steeper for the more educated.Using
the same people at different points of time,s also find that the
average growth rate increases continuously with education (except
for some graduate) with most of the difference from high school graduates
being statistically significant. --Thecoefficients on the education
variables are larger than most of the other coefficients though attending
private elementary school is the single largest coefficient.
While the average growth rate increases monotonically with ability,
nonef these coefficients are significant at th5% level. There are,
however, several interesting variables, which have significant and large
effects. For example, those who are Jewish have a growth rate 21% points
above that of Catholics. Several other SES variables are also significant.
For example those who attended private elementary school have a growth
rate 80% higher than those who didn't. Also mother—in—law's and
father—in—law's education are both significant and positive.
Of the time spent on youth variables, sports and part time job have
significant positive effects while chores has a significant negative—83—
effect. The nonpecuniary variables are significant with the exception
of helping others and job security, which is significant at the 6%
level. Those not interested in future financial prospects, nor in
challenging work, have a slower growth rate which also is truefor those
interested in independence in their work. The people who prefer to
be salaried have a 10 percentage point slower growth rate.
The age variable has a negative coefficient implying a concave
earnings function. The positive sign on year of first job also implies
concavity but this coefficient is only significant at the 5% level.
Those who were self employed in 1969 have a faster growth in earnings.
Increased hours on first job in 1969 also lead to a faster growth rate
130
but the opposite is true for hours on second job.Those who moved inter—
regionally after 1955 have a faster growth rate as do those who livein
bigger cities in 1969. Good health in 1969 as reflected in weeks lost
from illness and weight —areassociated with higher growth rates.
We have reestimated the equations dropping the variables that pertain
exclusively to 1969. The general results are unchanged.
The equations clearly indicate that there are important systematic
elements in the distribution of growth rates from 1955 to 1969. Is
an underlying structure that explains which of the determinants of
earnings in 1955 and 1969 are also significant in the growth rate equations?
Thismay be because the 1969 earnings are only for main jobwhile
the 1955 earnings may include all jobs. However, this variable seems to
represent those people with low wage rates who work hard. Thus it may be
representing some of the forces in Y55.In Mincer's theory, differentialgrowth rates reflect differential
investments in O.J.T. Thus the nreeducated, those whose in—laws
have high education, those who attended
private elementary school, those
who do not want to be selfemployed, don't want to be independent,are
not interested in future financialsuccess and who are Jewish, all
invest more than the omitted
categories. Mincer may be right, but one
still wonders why thesegroups are different.
An alternative explanation is that becauseof uncertainty, people
have to demonstrate theircompetence on the job which determines how
quickly they ascend their career ladders. Thereare different career
ladders with different characteristics.Some careers are relatively
safe but as a consequence have bQth
a relatively low ceiling on earnings
and a narrow distribution ofoutcomes. Other careers have higher
earnings ceilings but more risk. Becausepeople are relatively risk
averse the latter careers have higheraverage earnings. The difference
in earnings between ladders isgreater for older person's because the
sorting process takes place quentia1lyover time and people only
gradually reach the upper parts of theheirarchy.
This explanation, which can beapplied easily to the risk preference
and other nonpecuniary variables,can also explain why the other
variables are significant. Forexample, the in—law and private school
variables can be interpreted asproxies for nepotism. In an uncertain
world a nepotistic system can functionby a person be given a secure—85—
job and then only if he has the ability is hepromoted (thoughhis
promotions may come faster for equal ability). Since therearepay
scales within a firm, even the owner's son willonly receive very high
earnings if he holds an important job. We have argued earlier that
the religious variable is associated with driveand hard work,but
such effort may only pay off cumulatively.Finally, the educatio
findings reflect the types of career ladders chosen by themore educated.
Very few of our college graduates worked atany job but owner /manager,
salesman, or professional. Their choice may have been basedon
opportunities or preferences but in any event these can be thecareers
131
within which sorting is important andceiltng earnings are high.
Test of Predictions of Some Earnings DistributionTheories
We begin the discussion with the stochastic theories32Inthese
models initial earnings depend on an individual'scapacity but the
change in earnings depend on luck. Let theearnings of the ith
individual in year t be represented byY1 and the random event by ej
'3ven if thisalternative explanation is correct, Mincer'stheory may be correct in a formal sense. Lifetime earnings withincareer ladders
can be adjusted so that they are the same net of riskpremiums and non—
pecuniary rewards. But even here, the increase inearnings need not be
due to on the job training but couldsolely reflect the firm's learning
by observation, bhough a combination of thetwo learning mechanisms seems
more likely.
132
bee Mincer [- ) foran interesting survey and analysis of these
theories. The original work in thisarea is due to Aitcheson and Brown,LLJ
Champernowe, and Rutherford, and Mandej.brot ['S-'.31]. Variousassumptions about the distribution of the e's and aboutthe validity of 1) or la)
can lead to a normal, log normal or Paretoor other distributions.—86-
whichis assumed to be distributed independently of
stochastic theories canbewrittenas:
1) Y - +ej - +
N
la) 1nY —lnY_1+ ej —'io+ Ee
If the c's are serially independent, the distribution of Y will depend
solely on the distribution of e after a long nough passageof time.
Moreover with this assumption, the stochastic theories predictthat
the variance of earnings (orOf its log) will increase continuously
133
with time. These models either do not explain why education, ability,
etc. are correlated with earnings or they allow the correlation only
134
with In the latter case, these theories predict that the
correlations with education, etc. with Y decline over time since the
variance of Y increases.
The stochastic theories require that either the difference or the
percentage change in earnings be independent ofthe level of earnings.
But table 2 indicates that the mean growth rate in earnings isdifferént
at the highest and lowest levels of 1955 earnings and thatthose with
high earnings in 1955 have distributions with fatter tails.The difference
in mean growth rates can be attributed to transitory effects that do
not become impounded into a person's earnings base, but such an expiañäion
This is the assumption normally made and the one we will test.
However, it is important to note that Kaldor [c3 ] assumesthe e's to be
serially dependent. He is interested in finding conditions onthe correlation
of the e's so that the variance of earnings would be constant at all ages,
which is contrary to fact. It would be possible, however, to generate any
pattern on the tim profile of the variance in Y by makingthe appropriate
assuintons on thecorrelations of the e's.
The stochastic processes theories also provide no explanation of
why age earnings profiles slope upward or why the steepness varieswith
education.—87--
is not in accord with the Markov assumptions of the stochastic models.
As is evident from the pattern of the percentage changes and has been
confirmed by direct calculations, the average difference in earnings
increases with the level of Y55. Thus models expressed as equation 1
are also rejected by our data.
Since in Markov models, the education and other variiables are
correlated with Yo only, the variance explained by such variables
should decrease as people age. But education, ability, family background,
and other characteristics have an R2 of about 4 points higher in 1969
than in 1955 even excluding the information pertaining to 1969.
Investment in On the Job Training Models
Next let us consider the investment in on the job training theory
as presented by Mincer [351. HIsmodel can be thought of in the following
terms. Suppose skills learned on the job increase a person's marginal
productivity to many employers If an employee who receives general on
the job training is legally free to accept any job offer at any time,
after finishing his training he will be paid a wage equal to his new,
higher marginal product (ina competitive market). Next suppose
occupation A gives no general training and will pay a person the same
wage rate throughout his lifetime but occupation B involves general
training and has a rising age earnings profile for an individual. A
rational person would choose the occupation whose earnings stream has
the larger present discounted value. But Mincer argues that with free
entry into both occupations, the present 'ialue of the two earnings streams
will be equalized. Hence, since a person will receive a real wage equal—88—
to his marginal product after training, he must be paidless than his
marginal product while being trained.





wherewhich depends on schooling, ability, etc. is the constant earnings
of a person who never invests on the job, A is the fraction of earnir
invested, and r is the rate of return on investment on the job. Mincr
assumes that investments are a monotonically decreasing functionof
135
age. The change in earnings, Yt+l_Yt can be written as
which will be positive if A decreases with age.
Mincer has designated as the overtaking point that year in which
rEX equals A orwhen =. Supposefor the moment that everyone
was at the overtaking point at one year. Further assume that '1 is not
correlated with investment CorAl in equation 3 below) though Mincer's
136
theory does not rule Out such correlation. Assuming that At differ
by individual, people with the same Y and different investmentswill have
different changes in earnings subsequently. If the distribution of A
is independent of V,soalso will be the percentage changes in earnings.
Thus when examined at the overtaking point, Mincer's theory yields the
same testable hypothesis on growth rates as the stochastic theory as
expressed in equation la).
en we apply the tests we will reconsider the effects of this correlation.
,ee .BenPorath has shown analytically that such a
pattern will often arise from utility maximization behavior.Mincer's model, however, yields different predictions when growth
rates are calculated from a year that is not the overtaking point. We
can see this best if we specifythe on the ob training investment function.
Mincerinhis analysis often assumes that the individual', investment paths
are exponential as in equation 3).
_bt
3) X—A1e O<A<lb<O
The Implications of this investment equation (aswell as one with a
linear time trend) for testing this hypothesis which are derived in
will be summarized here. Mincer usually restricts b to be the same
for all individuals while letting A1 vary. In this case a length of
the overtaking period is the same for all A (andr) though the actual
overtaking year will vary for people of the same age because of differences
in time spent in school and military service. Mincer's model, therefore,
preditts that those with the higher A will have higher growth rates in
earnings.
If we knew Ai for each person, we could test the theory directly.
We can, of course, calculate the average earnings a person with given
set of measurable skills would receive, but the difference between an
individual's actual earnings and this average would be an imperfect estimate
of A1 since other unmeasured skills would also be in this residual. However,
as long as we are willing to assume that A1 is not correlated with
( or the unmeasured skills) we can classify people into groups between
which the average amount of A1 varies. That is in years earlier than
overtaking, those ( with the same education, ability, etc.) who are
investing more must be earning less and the earnings figure C perhaps—90—
adjusted) can be used as an instrumental variable or proxyfor A.
Similarly, those who invest more will have ahigher growth rate in
earnings. Moreover those who have below average earningsin the pre-
overtaking years will have above avesage earnings after overtaking.
According to Mincer, the overtaking point occurs in no morethan
hr years of work experience or probably less than a decade.In 1955
in NBER—TH sample the length of time in the civilian postWorld War II
labor market is 8 to 10 years of. most high school graduates, 7 to9
years for most of those with some graduatework and 5 to 8 years for those
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with one or more degrees. As a first approximation we canasawne that
everyone was at the overtakinoint in1955. But in this instance,
Mincer's and the stochastic theory generates the same hypothesis which
we have already rejected.
Because the more educated have worked fewer years and becauseindividuals
fo±low different investment paths, it is unlikely that all individuals
are at the overtaking point in 1955. Mincer often specifies ashis
investinett function equation 2) with bi equal tofor all persons. For
this investment function, the overtaking period is the same for people
with the same education (whobegin work in the same year). But when
we examine the distribution of growth rates within education groups, as
in tables . wefind the same pattern of results as above and this
pattern is unaltered if we standardize the observed growth rates orthe
1955 level of earnings for differences in age and time on the job.
13Zbout 1/2 of the high school graduates and 1/3 of the some college
graduates began work before 1942.S
Supposethat contrary to Mincerthe b'sdiffsr but on aveiage people
in all •duàational levels were at the overtaking point in1955. Since
earnings increase with education, on theaveragepeople with high education
but low earnings in 1955 must be investing more than people withless
138
education andthesameearnings.But those people with less education
and highearningsin 1955 must be investing less than the more educated.
Thus at each level of 1955 earnings, the meangrowth rateshould increase
with education as is found in tables 3—6. But under the same assumption,
within an education class those withsmallerearnings in 1955 must on
average have been investing more than thosewith more earnings. Hence,
the meangrowth ratesshould be inversely related to 1955 earnings within
each education group.139 Yet in-tables 3—6 the mean growth rates are
constant except for the very top andbottom tenths.
Itis possible that high school graduates are beyond the overtaking
point —especiallysince 1/2 of this group began work before World War II
while those with one or more degrees have not yet reached the overtaking
point. When either A or b vary in equation 2) the profileswill continue
138ThiSargument assumes that the other positive determinantsof
earningare not negatively correlated with education. However, wehave
recalculated tables 2—6 adjusting Y and tY/Y for differences in all significant
variables, e.g., we subtract out the average difference in earningsbetween
those in the bachelors and high school group or the top and bottom fifth, etc.
The adjusted tables yield comparable results(?).
139
rhistends to happen in the compound growth rates buc the differences
are not significant.—92—
tofan out beyond the overtaking point (aslongasinvestmentcontinues).
While for those people not yet at the overtakingpoint1 those investing
gorein 1955 should have the higher growthrate.In this case the
,correlation between mean growthratesand 1955 earnings level should be
positive for high school graduates and negative for collegegraduates.
But in tables 3—6, once the top andbottomfifths are eliminated, there
is not correlation at any education level in theaverage growth rates
and a slight negative correlation atany education level in the compound
growth rates.
The classification by observed percentiles in 1955may be affecting
the test of Mincer's theory since his formulation doesnot deny that an
individual's earnings in a year may be affected by randomevents. Suppose
such events are transitory so that, ignoring theon the job investments,
—Y+ e. Then as in Friedman[ /,) wewould expectthe top and
bottomtenth of 1955 earnings to include a larger proportion of those
with large positive and negative e's. But withtransitory events uncorrelated
over 14 years, we would also expect those at the top in 1955 because of
large positive e's to have low growth rates, etc. Replacing the observed
fraction of people in the top tenth in the left hand cell withthe overall
sample percentage the average growth rate becomes about 1.8 whilea
comparableadjustment for the right hand cell for the bottom tenth reduces
its average growth rate to about 2.2.' If these numbersare to be trusted,
table2 would yield a U shaped pattern ofaverage growth rates which is
not consistent with either the Mincer or luck theories.—93—
In making these tests, we have consistently assumed thatinvestment
(orA1) was not correlated with It is this assumption that, for
example, allows us to say that people with a given education and low
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1955 earnings must on average contain thepeople who are investing more.
Mincer's theory does not rule out eitherpositive or negative correlations,
which if large enough could destroy our ability todistinguish groups
with more or less investments in on the jobtraining.
There are several possible responses to thispoint. First our
equations indicate which variables have a significant effecton the gráwth
rate in earnings, which indicates differential investment.Standardization
for these variables (onthe growth rate and on Y55) does not alterour
conclusions though, of course, otrr equations do notexplain a majority
of the variance in earnings or its growth. Secondif Mincer is not
willing to specify the correlations a priori, then it will be difficult
to distinguish his theory from stochasticones since it is always possible
to find certain patterns of correlationsamong the error terms to generate
any age profile of variances.
The essence of Mincer's argument is that labormarkets functions well.
There are several reasons why our datamight reject the investment hypohtesis,
though Mincer's theory (withno correlation between A1 and Y1) might
be a partial explanation of earnings and thelabor market. By 1955 the
market might have adjusted for expectedwage changes that were not realized.
-140
fhe argument is the same as Friedman's [/ ], asto why people with low observed income onaverage should have negative transitory income.—94—
But if forecasts are generally incorrect, it is difficult to consider
how investment modelS can ever be verified with either cross section
or time series sample iormore importantly how such samples can be
analyzed within the context of equilibrium investment models.
Second Mincer's formulation only applies to general on the job trainthg.
No one has yet analyzed the implications of firm speific training on
earnings profiles though some arrangements must lead to rising profiles.
Sorting, Uncertainty and Heirarchy Modeir;
Another explanation of the change in the earnings distribution with
age is provided by a sorting uncertainty model. That is suppose that
employers are uncertain about a person's overall skill level because
performance depends on many skill-s some of which are thfficult to test
for in advance. The firm can react to uncertainty in many ways. One
particular method, which may be very relevant in a heirarchial structure,
is learning by observing. In this model firms initially place an individual
141
in a job which is an entry position for one or more career paths. Then
firms make successive decisions to fire, retain or promote on the basis
of both the observed and required competency in the particular position
held andthenumber of jobs openings in the next rung. People will be
promoted faster the more competence they demonstrate and the quicker
positions that they are qualified for open up.
Let us equate the positions with earnings and denote a per5ofl5
maximum earnings capacity as Y which is a function of education, in-
herited skills, etc. A person's prgoress towards '-isrepresented by an
141The initial assignmentsmay be based on "signals" such as education,
sex, age or various aptitude tests.—95—
adjustment process
5)in 'it"it_j.ajlnYj*/y11
We would expect a tovary over individuals and over time because of the
difficulties of different supervisorslearnings about the individual
and because appropriate
openings may occur randomly. In addition since
Y* is not observable weexpect a distribution of growth rates forpeople
at Y1.
This model has certain characteristics thatare different from
those of Mincer and are capable ofempirical verification or refutation.
For example since promotions dependon prior job performances, the most
able should, on average, be promoted fasterand always have a larger
growth rate in earnings. But for a given a
,thevariance of Y will
increase continuously withage.
Second this model does seem toprovide a consistent explanation of
which variables determine thegrowth rate in earnings. The sorting
model postulates that initiallyemployers have very little information
on a worker's productivity but that over timeemployee quality is rewarded
through faster promotions. The largergrowth rate in earnings by education
level —demonstratedin tables and inis in accord with this prediction.
However, the same regressions indicate thatmental ability only has a
weak effect on earnings' growth
rate. More positively the theory does
provide a rationale for the other variablessignificant in the growth
rate equations, as given above.
The remaining pattern of results intableandis explanable- 96—
within the sorting theory. Thosewhose1955 earningsars well below
(above) average must include more temporaryunder —achievsrs(low
achievers) and should have the faster growthfound in thsbottom(top)
tenth. Suppose that Y* is much greater for the"best"workers and that
Y55 is an imperfect predictor of who is"best". Since 1955 is still
fairly early in their working life, thebest could still have the lowest
1955 highest earnings growth rate. The constancyof the mean growth
rate between the 10th and 90th percentile mayreflect the downward pull
of people who in 1955 were at or above their potential,offsetting the
higher growth rate of the more talented.
It is unfortunate that only the 1955 and 1969data are, as yet,
available since a more definitive test of these twomodels rests on
whether those with low earnings in the early yearshave high or low
earnings beyond Mincer's overtaking point.Since Mincer's theory is
much more tightly specified than the sorting theory,it is easier to
find ways to reject it and the rejection is notbased on overwhelming
evidence. Thus it tight be fairer to say that the sortingshould not
be given any more precedence than Mincer's model.—97—
VII. Conclusions and Questiq.
Empirical Results
In our regressiOflB we have found a numberof significant 'riablea,
manyofwhich have never been examined bef ore. Nearlyall thcLevariables
have the same sign in equations explainingearningsin widely saparate
years and also have what weconsider to be consistent signsequations
explaining educational attainment, test scores,and assets.
In the earnings equations we find thateducational quantity and
quality, mental ability, business assets,certain aspects of family back-
ground (discussedbelow), preferences towards risk and towards nonmonetarY
aspects of a job, locational information,hours of work, health, and work
experience and age are significant determinantsof earnings. Among this
list of items are several, which to my knowledge have neverbeen found
significant in earnings equations, partlybecause they have never been
are
studied. But the empirical results,\ifl accordwith economic and social
science theory. For example, economists and othershave long recognized
that people can trade off earnings for nonpecuniaryrewards, but information
on what nonpecuniary rewards aretraded off with earnings and the importance
of such rewards are not available.
Our family background variables are much differentthan in most other
studies. For example parent's or especiallyfathers' education and occupation
are often used as the major index of. SES. Thoughwe started off using
these variables, we found that they became insignificantespecially when—98—
business assets were held constant.142 This suggests to it.thateducation
and occupation act primarily asproxiesfor financial and businoss
inheritance perhaps tinged with nepotism and not for hometraining.(Since
parental education is associated with the educational attainment and
test scores of respondents, we are only speaking of direct effects on
earnings.)
While the traditional SES variables are not significant we have found
others that seem to be related to the types of family life, and child
rearing processes that people have in mind when they talk of training
and taste formation. For example, we find that Jews earn significantly
more than and Protestants significantly less than Catholics (andthe
few aetheists and agnostics). Other studies have found that Jews of this
and surrounding generations have more drive and motivation for financial
success —perhapsbecause of fear engendered by centuries of economic
insecurity and because most of them were children or grandchildren of
inmiigrants who were poor and wanted to succeed. The Protestant—Catholic
result may be attributable to the Protestants in this group coming
from wealthier families who did not need to emphasize economic success.
While this conclusion may seem contrary to the Profestant ethic, others in
small samples have found that some Catholic groups —suchas German or
French —dobetter than the average Protestant. Given the education cutoff,,
in our sample and the cohort involved, it seems likely that we have drawn
Catholics from the above average earnings group.
'42Parental occupation and education is contained with unknownweight in
our biography variable. As argued in Chapter when onevariable, X, is
already included in another one variable Z with a weight of b, the estimate
coefficient on X is equal to c—bd where c is the true effect of X and d the
true effect of Z.Thus estimated coefficient is a net effect. But these
were significant before business assets were added.—99—
We also find that those who attend privat, elementaryschooland
high school earn about $5,000 a year more in 1969(in 1938 prices).
While there are a number of explanations for this result theone that
appeals to me is that these people come from very wealthy families who
use pull to advance their eons.
Another aspect of religious upbringing that affectsearnings is
frequency of attendance at religious( not parochial) school with those
attending most often earnings the least and those never attending earning
the most. The ones who attended more than twicea week are probably
certain subgroups of Catholics and more orthodox Jews. This variable
may help to distinguish those less interested in a material life, The
non—attendees are more difficult..to explain though nonattendance in the
1920's or early 1930's may represent avery atypical family.
We also find that those who spent their timedifferently on various
activities while growing up earn different amounts. Theexplanations for
these findings include indication of respondent's tastes and attitudes
as well as certain types of family rearing. For example, we argued that
respondents who..remembered spending time on chores, came from families
that are interested in conformity andproducepeople who enter into bureau-
cracies and safe jobs.
The more educated earn more though the graduate coefficientsare not
always higher than the bachelor's coefficients,143 The effects of education
143The inclusion ofvarious nonpecuniary and attitude variables generally
raises the coefficients on graduate education.—100—
increase with ageandth.age earningsprofilesaresteeperforeducation
than most other variables. However, in this samplewhich is stratified
differently than the population andhasa truncated distribution of
education and ability, the (average) range in earning.arising from education
are dwarfed by the range arising fromthe combination of ES or of trade—
of La for nonpecuniary rewards and are only of the samemagnitude as the
range associated with mentalability.144
Mental ability has a continuous direct effect on earnings(aswell as
indirect effects through educational attainment).The age earnings profile
slope upward with only a tendency for the moreable to have significantly
steeper profiles.
Risk premiums, and nonpecur4arytradeoffs are also a greater percentage
of earnings as people age. Given the crudeness ofmeasures,(O,l dummies)
it is not surprising that variables such as job securityand prefer to
be salaried ,bothof which are related to risk avoidance, have separate
effects. Combining these different variables and otherssuch as chores and
SES proxies into categories, the impression that comesthrough is that those
who take safe, unchallenging and conventional jobs progressivelyfall further
behind in earnings. That is, the high paying jobs are atthe top of certain
career ladders and cannot be reached by people onother ladders.
Time on the job is important especially early in..a person'scareer but
experience in some types of work is moretransferable than in others
types. However, people generally dobest when they do not switch
appears that much of the variabilityin test scores is genetic
in origin.—101-
occupations.' It also appears that hours worked isan important determinant
of earnings (thoughthe data is only avsiilable for 1969). However, there
arealarge group of menwhomoonlight because their earnings are low.
Business assets as measured in 1969 are one of themost important
variables in our equation explaining 10percent of thevariancein earn-
ings by itself. The coefficient is .11 in 1969 which isnot extremely
high on a before taxbasis.
We have also calculated the sameequationswithin various occupations.
Since many of the above variables are related tooccupational choice,
coàfficients tend to be smaller and less oftensignificant. But we do
find clear evidence that some skills, attributes,etc. are more important
in Bome occupations than others. For exampleintelligence is more important
for the self employed. Moreover the selfemployed who are the ones who have
more control over their work environment, have larger coefficientson
the various nonpecuniary measures.
We can explain moreof the variance inearnings in1969than in 1955 even
when we restrict our attention to varithlcsequ11y accurate in bothyears,
i.e., when we ignore business assets, etc.Second, the truncated education
variable has a partial R2 of about .05 though some of the effàcts
of education may be impounded in therionpecuniaryand othervcriables. The
biggest partial R2 in each year is attached to the 1969business asset
variable. This result probably does notgeneralize to the population since
we have a high proportion of self-employed, andseveralwith large amourof
businessassets. The SES variables (including all the time spent variables)
3 4 The skewness of kurtosis measures or dividedby c and a ,respectively which we allow to varyby whatis held constant in the numerator. Alsowe subtract 3,the expected value of the norial curve in the kurtosismeasure.—102—
and the nonpecuniarY variables (includingpreferred to be salaried)
each explainabout3% of the variance in the two years.
Mostof the variables have little or noeffect on our relative
skewness and kurtosis tneasures. However,business assets, attending
private 'e1ernentary and highschool, the nonpecuniarY variablesand the
tiue spent all reduce skewnessandkurtosis sharply in 1969.—103—
Methodo1pg
Perhaps the simplest way todescribe the rnethodolociiCal a.vanceswe
have made is that many phenomena'skills, and attitudes thatecoo:ists,
sociologists, biographers andothers have hypothesizedshould be related
to earnings, can be representedor captured by simple questiOfl5
that can
be included in mail surveys.it seems likely that more systematicefforts
would allow us to incorporate many
other skills, attitudes and preferences
or to refine existing measures.
The payoff from our work inunderstanding
the earnings distribution appearslarge and promises adequate payof fs for
other work in the area.
Relationship of Theory to Empiricalwork
t the beginning of thispae there was a lengthy discUSSiOfl ofvari-
ous theories, hypothesesand ideas that have beenadvanced to explain vari-
ous features of thedistribution of earnings. Our empiricalresults do
shed some light on the validityand importance of many of these.For ex-
ample Friedman suggested that
skewness arose because of differencesin risk
preferences. The variables which arerelatei to risk preferences include the
prefer to be salaried item, the entered occupationbecause of job security item,
and the time spent on choresitem.146 In each year, we find that
1460ur argument is that the people came from homes that breed conformity.—104—
those that want to avoid risk earnsignificantly less and that the diff-
erential grows with age and is a greaterpercentage of average earnings
(of high school graduai.as) as peopleage. Finally, we find that risk
preferences have an indirect effect with those who wantto avoid risk
obtaining less education. These conclusions are reinforcedby the
corresponding findin onthe;role of business assets.
Avoidance of risk can be considered onetype of noripecuniary reward.
We find that tastes towards other types ofnonmonetary returns also show
up as a reduction in earnings —presumablythrough the type of Occupation
in which a person chooses to work. We find that thosewho want interesting
work, or to help others, or who are not interested in future financial
success earn less and that these differentials increase withage. Rut
these variables do not contribute to skewness and kurtosis.
We also find evidence that those who are willing to work hardor
have drive or concern for financial success receive muchmore earnings.
These conclusions are based on the effects of religion,part—time job
-whilegrowing up, and entered occupation because it(work) was challenging.
These variables have larger effects over time.
a1:1 tugs,'
—105—
The3o last Goveral stoofrosuLt als suggost that mocle2.swhich
omphasisa thattrainingand taste formation (on earnings rilatodaspects)
Occurin thefamily,re1iqicu. instituti05, andwithinpeer groups have
a larqo grain of truth in then. Howvorthe lack of significance of
pArental education and occupationsuggest that education is too crude
an indicator of the differences inupbringing.
Many people have argued that a good portion ofearnings differentials
arise because of family pull. Whilewe have no variable which is an
unambiguous measures of nepotism, we have severalwhich lend themselves
to that interpretation. This,forexample, is the simplest explanation
of the in-laws education results andwhy the inclusion of business assets
wipes out the fathers education coefficients.Nepotism and/or inheritance
of controlling intcrcst in a businessseem to be likely explanations of
why the 22 people who went to private
elementary and high school earn onaverage
147 up to 5D per cent more than people who went topublic or parochial school.
Some theories such as the one thatgoes under the general title of
humancapitalare more general in nature. To the extentthat thehuman
capitalmodel means that people can improve their
earnings capacity by
expending time and resources onschooling or informal training, we find
strong support in our analyses. The educationcoefficients are signifi-
cant and large. Certain types offamily environment and Childhood
147
There is also indirect intorgeneratjoa
earnings transfers via edu- cational attainment and inheritedintelligence.—106—
activities are also significant. LIutthehuman capital modeloftenis
presented as one in which peopleinvest rationally, i.e. invest tothe
point wherethe rate of return on the last dollarequals the coat of
capital. This proposition is verydifficult to test becauee many of
the returns to education are of a nonrnonetarYvariety, have not been
examined in this tudy, and are net easyto convert into monetary
equivalents.
Mincer, in a brilliant series of pieces,has demonstrated that if
all on—the—job training is general,that all returns to such training
areinmonetary terms, and if the marketfunctions as a competitive
market would, then the human capitalmodel would predict that age earn-
ings profiles would rise with agefor investors and that the more in—
vestment the steeper the profile.His model also predicts
that the labormarketadjusts occupationl wages sothat the present
discounted value of lifetime earningswould be the same (to marginal
choosers) in relevant occupations. In itsmost general form, this
theory is a tautology with, for example,the amount invested in a year
adjusting to make eq'uations intoidentities. But with restrictions the
theory can be tested. We have performedcertain tests under the assump-
tion that differences in investment are notcorrelated with Y which is
the constant earnings a person would havereceived if he never invested
in O3T. We also performed our calculationafter adjusting for those
variables which we correlated with C3Tinvestmentpropensity. Wefind
evidence in Chapter that is at variance with the Mincermodel given
our no correlation assumption.We also find some evidence thatskills—107—
learned in one occupetienmaynotbe as taferctblci t anothcir occupation
as"home grown" skills. This suggests thatll trthing is not general.
Wehay,also examined stochastic modo].h. Since thosecanbe repre-
sented asdifferenceequations or Harkov chains, it ic alsotruethatthose
modelscan beusedto explain any age profile of vari1ncos of earnings as
well asgeneratingskewed models. But the most comnonstochastic models
assume that errors are uncorrelatod. We find several pieces of evidence
at variance with this view. For example, the percentage change in earn-
ings from 1955 to 1969 is not independent of 1955 earnings level and
the of the systematic elements increases over time thoughthe stochastic
model impliesa decrease.
Thesorting-uncertainty model, which I believe in, receives some
support from these findings. In.part thiseupport is in the growth in
importance of the effects of education and ability since these determine
potentialearnings.Additional support comes from thegrowthin the
differentials associated with drive, risk aversion, willingness to work
hard, etc., as stmutarized above. That is, these subjective measures are
best displayed on the job. The differential of 1955 experience on1969
earnings would be consistent with this model. We have reexamined the
screeningmodel of TW which isbased on easy to measure education being
used as a.barrier entry.The tests, which were derived in TW,stillin-
dicates that screening may be important.—108—
oblems and Extojog
- Severaldifferent typea of problems remain.?irst, our interprotation
of many of the new variableswe have used may bewrong. It would be very
useful for some one else,perhaps a psych1ogjt or sociologist,to tact,
validate and improve ourmeasures of risk aversion, eloomosynary
behavior,
etc. Second, we have spentvery little time examining interactions which
may be very important and may be biasing some of our results.
Third, we have not related our various
cross-section periods to macro,
time series developments.Fourth, the results are only generated withinan atypical
sample of a cohort which in turnmay be atypical because of war experiences and
the Depression and because the
economy and society are much altered now.
Thus many of our findings mustbe subject to replication in othergroups
before being accepted as not false.Finally we have not made muchprogress
on the nature/nurture or
exp1antjonz of the distribu-
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WORK EXPERIENCE, EARNINGS, AND INCOME
1. We would Ilk. you to describe your work experience below, starting with your present Job. An illustrative sot ofresponses have been included in dark type.
For the earnings Information, even very rough estimates will be helpful. If you are i.ifempioyed,markcolumn 1 is selfempicyid end Interpret
the salary columns as total Income. If you have more than one job please report salary on main job only.
Pension
V—_n, _______________.... Fsn -—
Worked (Annual full tlme (X If yes) joe
1 0011.
PRESENTJOB .,. El
PREVIOUS JOBS n. ?a—eAdd .
- 3.11•) Whir Khhirj (oil huJ ri. yo( lint iiR,iaii.n from hi Ar,nad If
l)tI,, AiirirS,4 tit>.iii ?l. 11i,,hn Juliroi (n.,r. 7. o... ±I'! boo. UP A,
——
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F RST JOB (of If coolingon'thtojoh rainIng ou Iik.n undor ho (>1 Sill, undir ffli pobilo low you'eiro •o,rrp bto.l,o' - -______________________ _____________________ Full.time, after FL 6 (Iwodiiiblodn.i.r.n, P3. 346 (oih.r OiiiIuC,)..__ Ylnishing school)
4, Whit job. han. you had nine. your .cpor,iIon trw,,, rho Arnr.d I-n,i.,7 (PI,u.. IA., your pnuni
lob Snr, h, own befor. that miii, iii I
L_nhdwri4r,
2. For the past year, please indicate the , rbeOfwaweeksr,1,, ""àd your tifs fatherd ring most
spent doing each of the following: m Alr,,.frP.,i.o
b.Per..,M.i.t wd LU. 1947P.O. 949Aino..OlI.P.,'.
—
— 7 2 --A--
Full-time work (or both full and part-time) _____ —JO—DESC.RIP1•JO Yourwn Part-time work . --___J-9_, _..
Paid vacation (if Do.onlbo ..t youa17ooe pmnwnqM$lfl5AR,fEciprIetorowner,)...,,,, 6-i
if1armiaratar_._ Out0f work or on layoff I2-1I..,... . __.
Check El it seasonal fbI How mony.rnplwyol.4ulyoo,up.,on.'..J,4Z11_..QJ.4j
(o>Howwill do 700t(ot 000 p.rlorrning 0 (our p0000nI work' (C'hek on, boo) Unable to work due to illness
Other (please specify) dIA Hon.r.oHdo700 li16Wrypo ol work yotl(o._Jo(0?' (Cjoko,'b0n') ........... 0 -2
Dulik. 11 0 K. ii', F1 Lik, ir otto, ban
Total L_.J • jobU Rosal (boctor, vyer,
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oood El
d root f it-nip> —Ma.
3. Please indicate your total househol incon fel'-the-4etIGw----_-..,,.. -
ing years. If your income was unusi lily
years, please indicate the average for sut ounciirn,years,,,00,100010, y5o4 yoor 6roOrpiS.Ln from rjJA1.eJ
(e.g. 1967.68-69). Foon,,? (Do niti 00001 ihort tour, 09 dot7 Ion rotor,. rr.loin9.) Yoo._ No,,,_,.
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EARNINGS OTHER
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Salesman 7
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41-62 Foreman or supervisor 07-1
"t—- —.--El 2
Semi-skilled fl 3
OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION Unskilled 0 -4
Questionnaireeiit Oeao.tcrISurVey. s.ampL A number of job descriptions are listed below. Ple, I)rt1d,u- Ik-Ia °n cat6 X which of these best describes your own job (A, rld' , , , 0 -6












































El-7 El-7A 1'WENTY•FIVE YEAR FOLLOWUP SURVEY
Sponsorsd by the National BureauofEconomic Research, NewYork,NewYork
We plaul to basin tabulations byjuly 1,
end would appreciate your returning
the questionnaire as soon as possible.
Identification
OIsrsrd ths small numbsrs the rtt the bouss thus' are for bUMoA purposes.
GENERAL INFORMATION
iWhatisyourageastblrthday)? years.
2. Pleas. check X below to Indicate your marital status.
05-1 Dat.





















6. What ii your approximate height?
ft. iteMs 25-11
7. What Is your approximate weight?
lbs. S5-24
EDUCATiONAl. BACKGROUND
1. Please fill In the following form. We have Included an illustrative set of responses In dark type.













3. Based on your own personal experIence, what do you think
high schools and colleges should concentrate on? IndIcate
26-27
your choice by circling the appropriate number on the






2.Please Indicate the highest grade of schooling completed
by each of the following family members: (High school














mathematics. etc.) 54 3 21 87
5384 General knowledge (history,
literature, science, etc.) 54 3 21 68 . Career preparation (vocational.
professional, etc.) 54 3 21 89
Activities (school clubs,
newspapers, sports, etc.) 5 4321 70
Social awareness (current
problems, community action, etc.)543 21 73WORK EXPERIENCE, EARNINGS, AND INCOME
1. We would like you to describe your work experience below, starting with your present job. An illustrativeset of reeporius have been included in dark type.






Permean 185148 $7,100 $5,800 2 42 4
2. For the past year, please Indicate the number of weeks
spent doing each of the following:
Cd III
OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION
A number of job descriptions are listed below. Please indi-
cate X which of these best describes your own job (A), and
which best describes the type of Job held by your father (B),




Check X if farm operator
A B C







Check X if teacher
A B C






































































Full-time work (or both tuii and part-time). -
Part-time work
Paid vacation
Out of work or on layoff
Check 0 if seasonal







3. Please indicate your total household income for the follow.
ing years. If your income was unusually high or low in these




YOUR OF OTHER INCOME TOTAL
TOTAL HOUSEHOLD (dividends, FAMILY
YEAR EARNINGS MEMBERS capital gains, etc.) INCOME
1968 $ $ $ $













o 0ATTI1UDE TOWARD JOE
In this section we want to find out how people feel about
their work. Just circle the number that bestdescribes your
own evaluation. The numbers constItute a scale rangin
from five (highest, beat, etc.) to one (lowest,worst,etc.
Doyou enjoy your work? 5 4 3 21
Doseyourwork provide • challenge? 5 4 3 21
Isyour work Interesting? 54 3 21
Porthe Itemslistedbelow,how dossyourtotalwork experience to
datacompare with what you eXpected whenyoufirststarted?
(3about as expected)
inanciaicompensation 5 4 3 21II
Requirement for independent
judgment 5 4 3 21 U
ResponsIbilIty 5 4 3 2 1U
Prospects for advanoemsnt5 4 3 21 14
Below i 5 list of poulbis requirements for achieving success in a
particular job orprofession. indicate on the scalewhereyour own
peofwork should be ranked. That is, to what degree doss success
In your work depend on: (3average importance for success)
Yourownperlormarlce 5 4 321 15
Having the right connections . .. .5 4 3 21 25
Being able to get along with people 5 4 3 21 37
Being luckyorunlucky 5 4 3 2 1 35
Having a collage diploma 5 4 3 21 15
Workingherd 5 4 3 21 30







3.Please Indicate X which of the following best describes
your voting habits:
Always vote in iccal, state and national elections .
Always vote in national elections, sometimas In state and
local ones
Usually vote In national elections
Sometimes vote In national elections
Seidomvotelnanyelections
4. Do you think of yourself as politically conservative or
liberal?
Very oonearvative C 554
Moderately conservative 0 4
Sometimes conservative, sometimes liberal C -5




































o .3 0 -4 47-48
0-20-3 50-51 0.204 53-54 0 .2 0 4 56-57
0 .3 0 4 59-60
o .2 0 4 82.63









in this section we would like you to indicate X the extent
of your participation in social, civic, religious, and other
similar activities.
1. WhIch of the following types of groups, if any, do you devote
some amount of time to, either as a member, an active


















SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL. AlTITUDES
In this section we would like you to indicate your attitude
about various social and economic problems. Please check
X the appropriate box, and feel free to add additional ex
pianation where necessary.
1. Do you feel that young people today have too much free-
dom, too little, or about the right amount?
Too much ... C 834 AbOut right... 0833 Too little... 083.1
2. Do you feel that people today are too much concerned with
financial security, too little, or what?
Too much ... 0844 About right.., 054-2 Too little ... 064-1
3. During the past ten years or so, do you think that the pace
of racial integration has been too fast, too siow, or about
right—considering the welfare of the country as a whole?
Too fast ... 0554 About right . -. 085-2 Too slow ... 055.1
4. Assuming you thought that the financial possibilities were
about the same, would you prefer to work for yourself or
for somebody else?
Prefer s.It.empioyrnent 056-3
No preference 0 .2
Prefer salaried employment . . . - 0 -1
5.Supposeyou thought that the financial advantages were,
on the average, slightly favorable if you worked for your.
self rather than for someone else. Would you then prefer:
Self-employment 0573
No preference 0 .2










74-75ASSETS, DESTS, SAVINGSAND PURCHASES—OPTIONAL
The following questions are of considerable interest to us, but we know that some people regard financial information of this sort as very personal. if that is your feeling, just skip this section. Pleas, return theform, since the other Information will
be of great help In the study. Once again, let us note that all replies will be treated with thestrictest confidence.
1. Please check X to Indicate the approximate amount of your household's assetsor debts in each of the following categories:
2. Please indicate the approximate change (either Increase or decrease) over thepast 12 months in each of the following:
3. During the past 12 months, have you
Purchased a home
Purchased a car
Purchased major durabtes, appliances, or furniture













Thank you very much for your cooperation in filling out this questionnaire, Ifyou would like to receive a summary of the
results when the study is completed, indicate b' X.







Checking accounts 0 3-1
Savings accounts and government savings bonds. -0 7-1
Common stock, mutual funds, other marketable
securities (current market value) 0 8-1
Value of your home (what It would currently sell for) 0 10-1
Equity In annuities and life Insurance
(cash surrender value) 0 11.1
EquIty In pension plan (other than Social SecurIty) 0 62-1
Other assets (own business, real estate) 0 13-1
Mortgage on your home 0 14-1












0-2 04 0-40-5 0-60-7 04 04 0-2040-40-5 0-6 0-? 0404




016-10 -20 $ Checking and savings accounts, government bonds
Common stock, mutual funds, other marketable
securIties (count only net new money put In or
taken out)
Equity In annuities and life insurance
(cash surrender value)
Equity in a pension plan (other than Social Security)
Other assets (count only net purchases or sales)
Mortgage balance outstanding







017-1 0 -20 -30 -4
Under $500-
$500 1,000
































0 -60 -70 -8
0 -60 -70 -8





0-9SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONNAJREiTWENTY.FIVEYEMt FOLLOW.UP SURVEY
Wewould like you to answer the following few questions, which represent items of tnformation thatwill
be helpful to us in Interpreting some of the data from the original questionnaire. Please use the return envelops
providedforyour convenience. Thank you,
o 6 5 93
Identification
PLEASE MARK IN THE APPROPR lATE BOX: The numbers at the right are for tabulation purposes.
0. 1: Are you working at th. same job as last year?
81 Yes-samojob
5.2 No . have changed job
0. 2: Have you ever owned end operated a full-time business
(do not Include medical or law practice, etc.)?
7.1 Yes- own arid operate business at present
( (please write in type of business) _________
7-2 Yes have owned and operated business In
past, but no longer doing so
If answer is Yes please go to 2A:
7-3 No - have never owned or operated busi-
ness
Q. 2A: Did you receive any help from a Voter8ns Adminis-




0. 3: How would you describe the town in which you grew
up?
9-1Rural area
9-2 Small town (under 10,000)
O 9-3 Moderate sized city (between 10,000 arid
50,000)
0 9-4 Large city (between 50.000 and 500.000)
O 9-5 Metropolitan center (over 500,000)
0.4: How would you describe your high school record?
O 10-1 Very high grades
• j 10-2 High grades
010-3Average grades
E1 10-4 Poor grades
0. 5: Was your high school work mainly concentrated on:
0 11-1Academic-type courses (colluge prepara-
tion)
0 11-2 VocatIonal-type courses (work prepara-
tion)
0.8: In the high school that you attended,were most of the
other students:
12-1FInancially better off than you
12-2 Financially about the same as you
D 12-3 Financiallyworseoffthanyou
0. 7: Please Indicate below how many brothers and sisters
you have (including those no longer living)
Older brothers and Younger brothers and
sisters sisters
O 13-1 None 14-1 None
0 13-2 1 0 14.2 1
O 13-32 0 14-3 2
D13-4 3 014-4 3
0 13-5 4 or more 14-5 4 or more
0.8: (FOR THOSE WHO ATTENDED COLLEGE.]
Do you think you would have gone to college if there
had not been a "CI Bill" which took care of most ex-
penses?
0 15-1 Yes -would havogone anyway
15.2 Probably would have gone anyway
EJ 15-3 No - couldn't have gone without Cl Bill
0 15-4 Don't knowA SUPPLEMENTTO
THE TWENTY•FIV2 YEAR FOLLOWUP SURVEY
Sponsored by tho National Duroau of Economic Roserch, New York, New York
We plan to bln tbuiations in 30 DAYSI
and would appreciate your returning
the questionnnlre as soon as possibI.
DisreCard the small numbers to the right of ths bond they irefortabulation purpocos.
FAMILY BACKGROUND AND EARLY CHILDHOOD
INFORMATION
1. While you were growing up and going to school, wh3t type
of house did you and your family live in?
Slnle.famlly house that we owned ....,...,.., 0 6.1
Single-family house that we rented 0 .2
Apartment o
Other 0-4
2. Did you share a room with other children or have a room
to yourself whUe you were growing up?
Shared room 0 7'l
Had own room 0 -2
Both, at different times .3
3. Up to graduation from high school, about how many times
did you and your family move?
Never moved—stayed In same house 0 8-1
Moved once or twice 0 .2
Moved three or four times 0 .3
Moved five times or more 0 -4
4. (For those who moved at least once.) Were all of these
moves within the same neighborhood or town?
Yes—within same neighborhood 0 9-2
Yes—within same city or town 0 .2
No—moved to different ciry or town 0 .3
No-—moved from farm to city or town 0 -4
5. At what age did you start going to school?
Under five years old (nursery school
or kindergarten) 0 10-1
FIve years old (kindcrcerten or first grade) - . - - 0 10.2
Six years old 0 10.3
Seven years old 0 10.4
Eight or older 0 10-5
6. What kind of elementary (grammar) school and high
school did you attend? (If more than one, check all
schools attended and circle the one from which you
graduated.)
Elementary
Type of School School
Public school 0 11-1
Parochial (religious) school 0 .2
Private (tuition-paying) school0 3
IDENTI FICATQN
001.708
7. Before you started school and while you were In elemen-




0 3.j 0 34-1 0.20,2 0-30.3 04 04
o -50 '5
0 'S0 .8
8. How marty years of formal schooling dId your mothar
receive?
0.4 years 0 15.1
5-6 years 0
7.8 years 0 .3
9.10 years 0 -4
10-11 years D •s
12 years (finished high school) 0 -6
13.15 years (some enlioge training) 0 '7
16 or more years (colloge graduate) 0 4
Don't know 0 .g
9. Aside from your regular school, did you also attend re-
ligious instruction or other church-related schools or
cIascs?




10. Please rank the following activities, indicating how you
wero most likely to spend free time while you were grow.
ing up? Indicate your choice by circling the appropriate











11. (Answer only if married.) How many years of formal
schooling dij your wife's mother receive?
0-4 years 0 23-1
5-6 years 0 .2
7-8 years 0 -3
9-10 years 0 -4
10-11 years El.s
12 years (finishcd high school) 0 4
13-15 years (Some co!leo training) 0 4
36 or more years (collage graduate) 0 4
Don't know 0 -9
Mothsr'u Work Statue
Worked full tTmo each year
Worked full time iome years
Worked part time each year









4 3 2 1 17
432 1 18 4 3 2 1 19 4 321 20 4 321 23





o -37. Have any of your children attended nursery school or
other prokindorgarten school?
All attended 0 42.1
Some attended 0 4
None attondod a
4 Since your marriage his your wife ever had a regular
full. or parttime jobl
Yss•,,,,,, , , ,, ,30.1 Pliiiiin,wi,Sest3i5
4 PlI,øaklt0u,slle.$
5.Please check the appropriate boxes to show your wife's
•mployment history from the time of your marriage, Note
that many peoplo have different answers deponding on
number of ysoro ofter marriogs; for example, many wives
do not work during their ffrut five yeori of merriago but
work part time leter on, etc.
W IsWlfs WI?.
P 4Workad War hod
Net part'ull j?f Workod,
Ysars After Marriage WorkTImiTims Typo 01 Job)
14 C4C .1 0 .1 81 32,38
59 04 04 04
3044 04 04 04
l5ormors....04 0.4 04
INFORMATION ONWIFE AND CHILDREN
Please answer QuestIons 1through5 only If married.
I.Approximatelyhow long have you been married?
.. . . years 14 U
2What Isth. approximate age of your wife at the present
time?
years 3921
3. What type of school did your wife attend when she was
growing up?
- . £lIm,nt,ry High Tp of School School School
Public school D 3010 294
Psrochlal (religious) school 0 .20 .2
Privat. (tultlon.paylng) school0 4 0 .3
(
Please answer Questions 6 and 7 only If you have one or more children.
6. Indicate the ages and the curront school status of your chlidrcn, inciudina children on longer living withyou. In the






Loch ChIld t= NurserySchool
Kklndergsrt.n
* = lust Grads
































0417. Fridmafl, N, "Choicc ,ChancearPri:tLuiCflof
i.P.., Aug. 1953. pp.277—90.




19 1.& .P WE,t,t1WD3 Cu11e 'c' tu
5. (If yes on 4.) Approximately how much total time (in
terms of weeks) have you lost through Illness during your
working Ufetime?
20.fluutS.'lncoiee Det2nniuattE to:.. wiii tLkttun
19.
thestate of your health? 6 $ine.yoloft miistqry seef±er World War II, have
2.gdian - - yoibverbeenunemployed? ' r 2 .j. ToI
•T 7 4 No 0 2
Dont recall 0 4 (if no, skip to General Information.)
22.Kagon ,J.LS Ti1k:SocaCi.:-E D f€.rceoChiTd Rcaring during
It j ttal time have
s p. you lost because of unemployment since you left the
3. During the time you were attending high school, how
serv ce
mary.eksper)cat didyou )ose1rrflschoI nthe I
average, due to your own illness or injury? (Exciuce in-
24JurirthieicS.?:.
a week 0 .2 ployed?
3.2 weeks 0 .3 Once 0
2:, ..i... ... .:jWJC , ,... .
breormoret4cnos.... . 0
-Ki i1Ie1ativcincomeShoreE.in Fa.:t o. e EconomtcJYici.,
GENERAt4NFol?.1AflON - 4. Over the last several years, have the average number of
hours you work each week:
1. What was your rank when you left active military service
after the Second World War? Increased substantially 0 55-1
27, KrerI,The StructurecfIricco.Some Q4nØ.PdOtCI&Vt.,.. .'r :. .2
—---.—--,.— 0 -3
moderately 0 -4
Decreased substantially 0 .5
- 1 -.
28.Lec.ctc, S. LSriC ;.O number
2. At w1atagedôp qxpectietfré? of hours you have worked in recent years? (Please write in.)
29.1i........S ta -WIit i'
jScboc1,Unv. of Wisconsin, MLdison..i9.5
30.Lydeil, h.The. St j5WhtisthMMe th9n or city where
3. Between now and the1Tñ&yoLi plan to retire, do you ex- you now live?
31ctt%, "ParetianDie tribut:ionsand fluraLarpa (t id.O pies"..Quarter56-1 :: 57—85. t(2,000)
::::: : ET :
Stay about the same 0 .3 Moderately sized city (50000.250,000) 0 -4
32. S±-l-- T.beo.ry. .adOo±oiStructulareocity (250,000-3 million) 0 5
Decrease substantiafl.T7T7T. Q metropolitan area (over 1 million) 0 42. We are interested in the kind of jobs people tale when
they first begin working, especially for those who leave
school before finishing in order to begin work. Please in-
dicate, by checking Yes or No, whether any of the following
circumstances were present when you began working
full time.
When you began work:
Were you married? 0 57-1
Did you have children' 0 58-1
DId you receive an exceptional
job offer' 0 59.1
Were you self -employed' 0 60-1
Was there financial presure to work? 0 61-1
Did you sçcnd much t,mc looking
for a job? 0 62-1
Did you regret having to leave school? 0 63-1
Did you have any specific vocational
traIning for the job' 0 64-1
3. As best you can remember, what factors influenced your
decision to enter the occupational field you are in at the
present time? Check yes or no to each of the following
and indicate factors that were of special importance.
Factors that influencad decision to
enter present occupation:
(
Please check below if you wish to receive a summary of
the results from this questionnaire.
I would like t receive the summary of results - . . . 0
Use this space for additional explanation where needed.
OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY












Type of training in school
Type of training in military -
Personal contacts (friends
or relatives)
Salary or pay offered
Prospects of eventual financial
success
Chance to do interesting work
Chance for Independent work
Chance for a lot of pcrson-to-
person contact
Chance to help others
Represented a challenge . . -
Job security
Provided a lot of free time.








































1.Altchison, I. & Brown. T CatnbidgeUniversity
Press,1957.
2. Arrow, K. andR.Lind. "Uncertainty and Evaluation of Public Investment
Decisions", American Economic Review, June 1970.
3. Atkinson, A.B. "On the Measurement of Inequality", J. Econ. Theory, 2, //3,
September 1970.
4. Becker, C. Human Capital, Columbia University Press, 1964.
5. Becker, C. "Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income: An
Analytical Approach" Woytinsky Lecture No. 1, University of Michigan,
AnnArbor,1967.
6. luau, P.&O.D. Duncan, The American 0ccup*iional Structure, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1967.
7. Bloom, B.S. Stability and Change in Human Characteristics,JohnWiley &
Sons, Inc. 1964 N.Y.
8.Burt, C."Quantitative Genetics in Psychology" The British Journal of
Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, Vol. 24, Part 1, Nay 1971.
9. Cavalli—Sforza, L.L. & W.F. Bodmer, The Genetics of HumanPopulation,San
Fraxiqisco: W. H. Freeman & Co, 1971.
10.Champernowe, D.C. "A Model of Income Distribution" Econ. J., 1953.
11. Christensen, L. "Tax Policy and Investment Expenditures in a Model of
General EquIlibrium" 1969 A.E.R. meetings
12. Clark, B. ,Heist, P, McConnell,T. etal. Students and Colleges: Interaction
and change. Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, Univ.
of Calif. at Berkeley, 1972.
13. Crockett, J. "Technical Note" in Consumption and Savings, Vol. II, U. of P.
Press, ed. by Friend & Jones, 1960.
14. Eckland, B. "Academic Ability, Higher Education and Occupational Mobility"
American Sociological Review, Oct. 1965.
15. Featherman, D. "The Socioeconomic Achievement of White Religio—Ethnic
Subgroups: Social and Psychological Explanations" American Sociological
Review, 1971, Vol. 36 (Apr): 207—222.
16. Friedman, N. A Theoryofthe Consumption Function, Princeton U. Press, 1957.cac
tIOIIs,
i1 LLf.Univ. Lt
1.8Grilichea, Z, ad W Mason,"Ed.ication Income and Ability", JIPrE., May— 2.teI A socioeconomic Anaiysio Fan ii-d1dng Behavior' unpublished
ocora1 issertation,Univ.of Penn. ,J973.
19.Ravetnann, E. & P.- West, They Went to College: The College Graduate in America
Today, N.Y.: }Iarcourt, Brace, 1952.
20. Hunt, S.J. "Income Determinants for College Graduates and the Return to
Educational Investment" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale U. 1963.
21. Jinks, J.L. & D.W. Fulker," Comparison of the Biometrical, Genetical,
Maya and Classical Approaches to the Analysis of Human Behavior" Psychological
Bulletin1 May1970,Vol. 73, No. 5.
22. Kagan, J. & S. Tulkin. "Social Class Differences in Child Rearing during
the First Year" in The Origins of Human Social Relations ,ed.by ll.R.
Schaffer, Academic Press, 1971.
23. Kaldor, N. "A Model of the Trade Cycle" Economic Journal, Vol. L,l940,p.78—92.
24. Kendall, M.C. andA.Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Griffin, London,
1961.
25. Kohen, A., Parnes,H. & J. Shea, "Income Instability Among Young and Middle—
Aged Men" Center for HumanResourcesResearch, Ohio State, 1972.
26. Kravis, I. "Relative Income Shares in Fact and Theory", American Economic Review,
Vol. 49, Dec. 1959.
27. Kravis, I. The Structure of Income: Some Quantitative Essays, Phila., 1962.
28. Lebergott, S. "The Shape of the Income Distribution" Amer. Econ. Review,
June 1959, pp. 328-47.
29. Little, J. A State—Wide InQuiry into Decisions of Youth About Education beyond
High School, Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, 1958.
30. Lydall, H. The Structure of Earnings, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
31. Nandeibrot, B. "Paretian Distributions and Income Maximization" Quarter]y
Journal of Economics, Feb. 1962, pp. 57—85.
32. Merton, R. Social Theory and Social Structure33. Miller, H. Income Distribution in the United States,iYO. Bure3u of the
Census Monograph, Washing-ton, D.C. 1966.
34. Miller, H. "Annual arid Lifetime Income in Relation toEdcation:1939
to 1959." Amer. Econ. Review, Dec. 1960.
35. Mincer, J. "The Distribution of Labor Incomes: A Surv2ywithSpecial
references to the Human Capital Approach"J.E.L., Marh 1970,Vol.III,No.l.
36. Mincer, J. "Schooling, Experience and Earnings"N.B.h.rc Mirneo, Feb. 1973.
37. Project Talent. The American High School Student, Cooerative Research
Project No. 635, Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1964.
38. Reder, 11. "A Partial Survey of the Theory of Income sizeDistribution"
in Six Papers on the Size Distribution of Wealth arid lnconie, ed. L. Soltow,
N.B.E.R. 1969.
39. Mittler, P. The Study of Twins, 1971 Penguin Books.
40. Roy, A.D. "The Distribution of Earnings and of Individual Output" Economic
Journal, Sept. 1950, pp. 489—505.
41. Sewell,W.H. & V.P. Shah. "Sociojconmic Status, Intelligence, and the
Attainment of Higher Education" Sociology of Education ,40,Winter:1—23.'
42. Simon, B. & Ellison, A. "Does College Make a Person Healthy and Wise?" in
Does College Matter? ,ed.by L. Solmon & P. Taubman, Academic Press, N.Y. 1973.
43. Solmon, L."The Definition and Impact of College Quality"N.B.E.R. Working
Paper #7, 1973.
44-.Solmon, L. & P. Wachtel, "The Effects on Income of Type of College Attended"
Forthcoming in Sociology of Education.
45. Spence, M. "Market Signalling" mimeo, Harvard U. 1972.
46. Taubman, P. & T. Wales, Higher Education: An Investment and a Screening Device,
N.Y.: N.B.E.R. forthcoming.
47. Taubman, P. Schooling, Ability, Nonpecuniary Rewards, Socioeconomic Background
and the Lifetime Distribution of Earnings, N.Y.: N.B.E.R. forthcoming.
48. Thorndike, R. & E. Hagen. Ten Thousand Careers, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
1959.
49. Tinbergen, J. "On the Theory of Income Distribution" in Selected Papers,
Amsterdan: North Holland Publ.Co., 1959.
50. Wales, T. "The Effects of School and District Size on Education Costs in
British Columbia" 1972 Discussion Paper #83, University of British Columbia.51. Wise, D. Academic Achievement and Job erEorninc2: Earnings and Promotions,
Doctoral Dissertation, Berkeley, Calif. Univ. of
52. Wolfe, B. "A Socioeconomic Analysis of Farjilv Building Behavior" Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation,Univ. of Penn. ,1973.